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SUMMARY
This Knowledge Note provides an insight into current realities, behaviour 
and practices in arms and ammunition storage sites in north-western DR 
Congo. Tailored recommendations for strengthening ammunition and 
weapons safety by improving physical security measures and renovating 
infrastructural facilities are a central focus of this report and the 
corresponding technical studies. In light of these technical findings, and 
on the basis of on-site observations as well as interviews with community 
members and armed forces personnel, this Knowledge Note emphasises the 
importance of factoring in the socio-economic and humanitarian context of 
the weapons and ammunition storage sites. 
Through a range of case studies, an analysis of relevant legislative 
frameworks and how communication is channeled through relevant 
physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) authorities as well as 
an examination of the difficulty of translating existing PSSM knowledge 
into action, the study highlights some of the behavioural practices—and 
challenges—that underlie the development of an effective PSSM culture.
The objective of this Knowledge Note is to help order and prioritize some 
of these factors, identifying how the national government of the DRC can 
enhance its efforts to establish a more responsible culture of PSSM-related 
practices. By highlighting areas of work where targeted interventions would 
be most useful, the recommendations of this baseline study aim to help guide 
ongoing regional and national efforts to implement more responsible PSSM-
related practices in a limited resource environment.
The safety mechanism visible on a Belgian manufactured 7.62mm Fabrique Nationale (FN) FAL with Armée 
Nationale Congolaise (ANC) markings from 1969.
All photographs copyright Nikhil Acharya / BICC.
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Technical and humanitarian assessment of arms and ammunition security, storage and management practices in the Nord-Oubangui and  
Equateur Provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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Introduction 
BICC commissioned a technical and humanitarian 
assessment of arms and ammunition security, 
storage and management practices in the Nord- 
Oubangui and Equateur Provinces of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo from September to October 
2015. The study was carried out by a technical 
advisor from BICC in partnership with a technical 
expert from the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), a 
researcher from the Group for Research and Informa-
tion on Peace and Security (GRIP) and a delegation 
from the Commission Nationale de Contrôle des 
Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre et de Réduction de 
la Violence Armée or the CNC-ALPC, the national 
authority tasked with co-ordinating all arms 
control-related activities in the DRC.
The study focused on assessing the technical aspects 
of physical security and stockpile management 
(PSSM) practices in the area while locating these 
practices in a wider socio-economic context, high-
lighting the potential humanitarian impacts on the 
surrounding communities of either an unintentional 
A PNC officer works in his office under a hand-drawn map of Oubangui 
and Equateur Province. Mobayi-Mbongo police outpost, Nord-Oubangui.
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explosion at a munitions depot or the diversion of 
poorly secured small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
into illicit hands.
The areas selected for the assessment—Nord- 
Oubangui and Equateur Provinces—border the 
Central African Republic and Republic of the Congo 
and are close to the frontier with South Sudan and 
eastern areas of the DRC, which are all heavily 
affected by conflict. Focusing the study on a selected 
area of northern DRC therefore presented a valuable 
opportunity to conduct a limited analysis of how 
cross-border dynamics affect PSSM practices in the 
region while reiterating the need for a weapons 
control approach that increasingly focuses on trans-
frontier and regional aspects.
This regional approach also constitutes a central 
aspect of BICC's efforts on arms control and regu-
lation that has been developed in cooperation with 
the German Federal Foreign Office's Division for 
Conventional Arms Control. In close collaboration 
with the African Union’s Defence and Security Divi-
sion, a Coordination Platform is being developed to 
integrate the regulation and control of illicit SALW 
into the regional security and development agenda. 
Recognizing the existence of multiple actors in the 
region and at the national level, more effective coor-
dination through a unified platform could reduce 
the duplication of efforts and optimize the use of 
limited, valuable resources.
More effective coordination can have a significantly 
positive impact on controlling the illicit circulation 
and trafficking in SALW and ammunition as well 
as reducing the risks of an unintentional explosion 
by implementing more responsible storage and 
management practices of munitions. Similarly, there 
is also a critical need to link PSSM practices with 
related ground-level SALW control measures such 
as registration, marking and tracing of SALW, more 
accurate and reliable record-keeping initiatives that 
are compatible with other data collection mech-
anisms in the region and improved arms control 
legislation.
The authors reiterate the need for greater coordi-
nation amongst national actors responsible for 
designing and implementing SALW control efforts, 
including PSSM, in the country by working together 
in a transparent and cooperative manner. Keeping 
in mind the fact that effective arms control cannot 
take place in isolation, the authors also call for 
greater cooperation and knowledge-sharing amongst 
national authorities in the region under the frame-
work of existing regional cooperation mechanisms. 
To be truly effective, wider issues relevant to SALW 
control such as effective border control also need 
to be factored in to programme design and imple-
mentation. These include more effective regulation 
and control of illegal cross-border trafficking of 
high-value commodities other than firearms such 
as drugs and endangered species products as well as 
trafficking of human beings. 
Often, similar patterns can be observed: Goods 
are transported across the same routes or vectors, 
similar supply and demand variables are at play, the 
same armed groups transporting illicit weapons 
across borders frequently profit from trade in other 
illegal commodities, profits from which have been 
shown to feed back into fuelling further conflict.1 
This serves to reiterate the fact that a more compre-
hensive understanding of the many relevant factors 
at play, including the motivations for illicit SALW 
possession, should feed in to a concrete, coordinated 
strategy towards addressing deeper causes of conflict 
and that strategy’s integration into wider conflict 
prevention, resolution and peacebuilding efforts.
1 \ The poaching of increasingly rare elephants at an alarming rate by 
armed groups using illicit weapons and ammunition is one such 
example of a rapidly growing conflict economy. The same armed 
groups or organized crime networks then sell this ivory across 
borders using similar transit points and mechanisms as trafficked 
weapons (see Acharya & Mühlen-Schulte, 2016). These profits are 
in turn used to purchase more weapons which contribute to or 
catalyze further insecurity in the region. Methods or approaches to 
control this phenomenon are also remarkably similar and cross-
border  cooperation is essential for these efforts to be successful. In 
fact, countries such as Gabon are advocating a PSSM approach to 
ivory stocks that includes securing storage areas and even efforts to 
mark tusks to prevent them from returning to illicit economies and 
 fuelling further conflict. 
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In practice, PSSM is an inherently complex field 
involving a multiplicity of actors from the minis-
tries, armed forces, international organizations and 
NGOs. As the issues at stake are highly sensitive, 
involving weapons stockpiles, ammunition depots 
and armouries that are central to a nation's security, 
identifying relevant procedures, designing policy 
and implementing activities are all inherently 
difficult. The willingness of states to co-operate and 
provide access to facilities in a transparent manner 
requires developing an atmosphere of trust between 
national partners and international agencies over a 
period of time. One starting point for building this 
trust is to focus on why responsible PSSM prac-
tices are mutually beneficial to the branches of the 
military operating storage sites and the citizens of 
a country. Identifying the most effective pathways 
and clearly defining the communication channels 
to move this process forward is necessary to achieve 
concrete outputs or goals.
Another potential area of agreement is to recognize 
the adverse effect of the proliferation of weapons 
and the diversion of arms from government-held 
depots on exacerbating conflict and crime in the 
country and the wider region. The possibility of an 
unintentional explosion at a munitions depot poses 
a threat to communities inhabiting the danger 
zone around several storage sites in the DRC and in 
the wider region. The memory of the fire in Ngashi 
(Equateur Province) in 2007 is etched on the collec-
tive consciousness of soldiers and civilians alike, as 
many of them are from this area and were involved 
in transporting arms and ammunition to the new 
facility in Bokala. Many senior officers and author-
ities in the DRC are also aware of the more serious 
explosion caused by a fire in the ammunitions depot 
of Regiment Blinde in the Mpila neighbourhood of 
Brazzaville, which killed over two hundred people 
in neighbouring Republic of the Congo on 4 March 
2012. However, although the awareness of the danger 
of another large explosion often exists, it is difficult 
to translate these memories or knowledge into more 
responsible behaviour in practice. A key recom-
mendation of this study is that, rather than wait 
for another inevitable large explosion or another 
large-scale diversion of firearms and ammunition, it 
is critical that PSSM measures be implemented in a 
preventative manner and not as a knee-jerk reaction 
in the aftermath of another crisis or political insta-
bility.2
The objective of this Knowledge Note is to help order 
and prioritize some of these issues, identifying 
ways of how the national government of the DRC 
can initiate a more responsible culture of PSSM- 
related practices. By highlighting areas of work 
where targeted interventions would be most useful, 
the recommendations of this study aim to help guide 
ongoing efforts to enhance existing capacity to 
implement measures to pave the way towards more 
responsible PSSM-related practices. These interven-
tions involve targeted international assistance by 
qualified international organizations that possess 
the necessary technical expertise necessary to 
manage the full life cycle of weapons and munitions. 
In the same vein, interventions should be made by 
the relevant government authorities in the DRC to 
take the initiative and conduct several PSSM activi-
ties that require minimum or no capital investment. 
When necessary, authorities ought to make avail-
able the financial resources to destroy obsolete or 
unstable munitions or weapons and construct new 
infrastructure, including new armouries or dedi-
cated, secure storage facilities. 
Finally, by painting a scenario of PSSM practices 
in north-western DRC, this study aims to provide a 
wide range of readers with an insight into current 
realities, behaviour and practices in arms and 
ammunition storage sites. The basic pillars of PSSM 
viewed through a technical lens such as physical 
security measures, infrastructural facilities and 
tailored recommendations for ammunition or 
weapons safety and storage are a central focus of 
this Knowledge Note and the corresponding technical 
studies. Based on observations made at the sites 
and in light of these technical findings, this study 
examines broader issues related to the manage-
ment of the full cycle of weapons and ammunition 
stockpiles and armouries, providing a more nuanced 
2 \ It is also worth noting that this was also a key conclusion of the 
High-Level Government and Experts meeting held at the African 
Union in October 2015 at which representatives of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo were present.
SAFETY FIRST \ ACHARYA, GRUMEL & VRANCKX
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 2 \ 201610 \
comprehension of relevant legislative frameworks, 
organizational channels of communication as well 
as the specific socio-economic and humanitarian 
context of the field sites and of how local institutions 
interact with international humanitarian and other 
assistance providers.
In addition, it addresses certain issues that are not 
normally investigated as part of a standard PSSM 
assessment but that are very relevant. One factor are 
competing threat perceptions regarding dangerous 
munitions sites by at-risk communities who might 
prioritize access to clean drinking water or food 
over the less 'tangible' threat of an unintentional 
explosion. Other aspects include taking a longer 
historical view to look for clues to current practices 
and to better understand the relative ways of how 
memory and forgetting colour the history and future 
of PSSM in a country and region with a history of 
unintentional munitions explosions. It suggests 
recommendations for implementing ‘training of 
trainer’ programmes to create a conducive envi-
ronment in which the observed difficulties when 
translating theoretical training into practice are 
addressed and, where possible, the role of cross-
border dynamics including weapons trafficking and 
artisanal weapons production are also highlighted. 
The intention of this limited study conducted in a 
short time frame is to flag these important issues 
for stakeholders to be aware of. These issue areas 
could then serve as a guide to help the DRC author-
ities to design and implement a PSSM roadmap in 
the future, and move a step closer to creating an 
operational environment that is more conducive to 
a responsible, effective management of the full cycle 
of storage, management, disposal and security of 
arms and ammunition.
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 2 \ 2016 11 \
SAFETY FIRST \ ACHARYA, GRUMEL & VRANCKX
A technical field manager on the assessment team examines a Kalashnikov pattern rifle at an FARDC armoury in Mandaka.
Context and method
This section introduces a working definition of PSSM, focusing on the need to 
reconcile international PSSM standards with local realities in limited-resource 
contexts. A brief historical background is provided to illustrate why there is such 
a high proliferation of SALW and munitions in the north-western Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, briefly highlighting the regional context for why Equa-
teur and Nord-Oubangui Provinces were selected for this particular study. Next, it 
provides a detailed explanation of the methodology adopted for this assessment 
process as well as the process of incorporating feedback from the interviewees in 
order to validate the findings. Finally, this section ends with an overview of sites 
visited and interviews conducted.
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Physical security and stockpile 
management in a wider security 
context
Physical security and stockpile management, or 
PSSM as it is abbreviated hereafter, refers to the 
protection and management of arms stockpiles. 
Arms and other means put at the disposal of defence 
and security actors in charge of protecting the 
state and population, are ideally maintained in a 
functioning state and are stored at locations from 
where these can be swiftly retrieved when needed. 
The facilities where the arms are stored should be 
secured to prevent pilfering of their contents by 
those that might use these arms against ordinary 
citizens or against the security and defence forces 
responsible for their protection. PSSM should also 
prevent the stored materials from becoming a safety 
hazard, such as when they contain explosives that 
might detonate in an uncontrolled way, inflicting 
severe damage and a high death and injury toll on 
surrounding communities.
The safety, security, and accountability of arms and 
ammunition stockpiles depends on available infra-
structural facilities as well as the practices followed 
by the facility operators. Standards have been estab-
lished for facilities and practices that are important 
benchmarks to assist in facilitating greater safety, 
security, and accountability. The real challenge lies 
in reconciling the objectives contained in the inter-
national standards with local circumstances where 
financial and human resources are often limited. A 
step in this direction is offered in this report, which 
considers the international standards while tailoring 
recommendations to the specific context of ammu-
nition and weapon management practices observed 
within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Historical background: Two decades of conflict, 
humanitarian crisis and SALW counter- 
proliferation assistance in context
Almost twenty years have passed since the outbreak 
of armed conflict that led to the fall of President 
Mobutu Sese Seko and the renaming of Zaire as 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Conflict has 
continued since, taking a huge toll on the country’s 
population, infrastructure and institutions. Stability 
has been temporary, at best. Relapses into armed 
violence have been frequent in some parts of the vast 
territory. International humanitarian aid workers 
and their organizations have become a very present 
feature in this landscape. 
As recently as 1998, troops from Rwanda, Uganda 
and Burundi occupied parts of the DRC’s territory. 
A ceasefire agreement was signed in Lusaka in July 
1999 by the Heads of State of the DRC and five other 
African nations that had deployed troops in that 
country. This was followed by the Global and Inclu-
sive Agreement on Transition in the DRC signed in 
December 2002. This latter agreement committed 
the existing national army, the Forces Armées 
Congolaises (FAC), and a number of non-state armed 
groups in the DRC to integrate into one new national 
army, known as the Armed Forces of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (FARDC, Force Armées de la 
The safety mechanism visible on a Belgian manufactured 7.62mm 
Fabrique Nationale (FN) FAL with Armée nationale congolaise (ANC) 
markings from 1969.
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RDC). The non-state armed groups incorporated into 
FARDC were the Rassemblement congolais pour la 
Démocratie (RCD), the Mouvement pour la Libération 
du Congo (MLC), the RCD/Mouvement de libération 
(RCD/ML) and RCD/National (RCD/N). Local commu-
nity defence militias known as Maï Maï were also 
incorporated within FARDC. These new soldiers 
and officers were found to show little loyalty to the 
authority of their state and have been prone to desert 
and mount new rebellions (Berghezan, 2014). 
As of July 2003, the United Nations Security Council 
put in place an arms embargo, seeking to prevent all 
transfers of arms into the territory of the DRC. From 
2008 onwards, that embargo was scaled down so as 
to only prevent arms transfers to non-state groups 
operating in the DRC territory. 
The arms that had been brought into the country 
and were used during the recurring conflicts 
remained a cause of concern to many actors in the 
area. Not all of the arms brought into the country 
were recovered through formal DDR programmes 
that were conducted in some areas of the vast 
country. Arms were also found left out on the streets 
and were brought under the control of the state. But 
an undetermined number of arms (and munitions) 
are assumed to have been retained by demobilized 
former combatants. Campaigns to help convince 
local communities to hand over these arms and 
ammunition were run in several departments. These 
DDR and civilian disarmament campaigns however 
failed to reach every area of the country, such as the 
Province of Equateur, including the newly formed 
Nord-Oubangui Province.
Site selection criteria
The two primary areas of focus of this study in 
north-western DRC are the wider Mbandaka area 
in Province Equateur and the areas in and around 
Gbadolite in the Province of Nord-Oubangui.3
These sections of north-western DRC have not been 
priority target areas for SALW-control interven-
tions and the region has not benefited from DDR 
programmes conducted elsewhere in the country. 
In comparison to the east of the country, where a 
relatively large concentration of international actors 
remain due to continuing conflict, and SALW-re-
lated security perceptions were extensively probed 
no later than 2010 (Berghezan, 2011), the situation in 
north-western DRC has been less well documented. 
Limited information exists regarding the current 
state of arms control, including PSSM in Equateur 
and Nord-Oubangui Provinces. This is one reason 
why these two areas were selected as priority areas 
for this study. Another reason was that PSSM prac-
tices could be examined in a situation of relative 
“normalcy” and far greater calm as compared to the 
more crisis-prone eastern DRC. 
Finally, the decision to select north-western DRC 
as the area of focus for this study was guided by 
the intention to locate this assessment as part of 
3 \ The province of Nord-Oubangui was part of Equateur Province until 
mid-2015. Since then it is delineated as a separate administrative zone.
A 7.62mm Heckler and Koch G3  pattern rifle  originally brought to  
the DRC from Angola. The Spanish markings indicate it might have 
originally been used by Cuban troops.
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a broader, regional programme of work on arms 
control. The fact that Province Equateur shares a 
border with the Republic of the Congo, and the Prov-
ince of Nord-Oubangui is separated from the Central 
African Republic (CAR) by the liquid frontier of the 
Oubangui River were therefore significant site selec-
tion criteria, offering the opportunity to examine 
PSSM practices in a cross-border context.
The cross-border context is relevant with regard to 
arms flows, arms embargoes in place in CAR and 
South Sudan and also with regard to cross-border 
flows of other legal and illegal commodities.
Adopting a regional approach is essential to enhance 
knowledge sharing amongst neighbouring countries 
and establish a model of trust. By using the DRC as a 
good example for why PSSM assessments are useful, 
this study could set a positive example for other 
countries in the region to realize the mutual benefits 
of conducting regular PSSM baseline assessments 
and follow suit in due course. 
This is also why BICC, along with the German 
Federal Foreign Office, has been supporting regional 
mechanisms such as the Sub-regional Arms Control 
Mechanism (SARCOM) that connects the DRC 
with Sudan, Chad, Libya, CAR and South Sudan.4 
Nord-Oubangui Province shares a liquid border with 
CAR—the easily traversable Oubangui River—and 
Equateur Province, which shares its western border 
with the Republic of the Congo across the wider 
and mightier Congo River. In the wider region, the 
neighbouring north-eastern province of the DRC, 
Orientale Province, shares a border with South 
Sudan and the eastern part of the DRC—areas with 
a long history of conflict. At the time of the study, 
fresh fighting had broken out in and around Bangui 
in CAR, and levels of violence were increasing in 
South Sudan5. The understanding that trans-frontier 
dynamics are likely to have an effect on trafficking 
in arms made it pertinent to try and assess PSSM 
practices in light of such dynamics. 
4 \ South Sudan is currently an observer state within SARCOM.
5 \ For security sector reform in South Sudan, see Breitung, Paes, &  
van de Vondervoort, 2016.
The vast Congo River serves as a lifeline for communities to  
transport a range of commodities
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Selecting this particular area also provided an 
opportunity to gather information on cross-border 
flows between the DRC and CAR as well as begin to 
probe the impact of arms embargoes on CAR (and 
South Sudan).
Finally, the study also paid attention to cross-border 
flows of illicit commodities other than illegal fire-
arms whose trade could also fuel armed violence. 
One such area of investigation was the intersections 
between the trafficking of endangered animal parts 
by armed criminal groups using illicit weapons 
and ammunition.6 Improving our understanding 
of this practice was also one reason why armouries 
of the Eco-Gardes—a paramilitary branch supplied 
with weapons and trained by the FARDC—were also 
examined.7
Methodology
Assessment process and approach to PSSM
The approach taken in this study is to provide a 
snapshot of PSSM practices and approaches in the 
selected region of the DRC to determine whether, 
and if so how, safety, security and accountability 
can be improved. As such, this study considers the 
different components of stockpile management, that 
is accounting, surveillance and proof, security, plan-
ning, disposal and destruction, while prioritizing 
the needs deemed most urgent.
Rather than resorting to standards deemed 
“universal”, which the DRC would have great 
difficulty to comply with, the authors adopted an 
approach tailored to limited available resources and a 
complex working environment. Given difficult oper-
ational conditions and limited human and material 
resources, it is not possible to directly implement 
global universal standards such as the International 
Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). In fact, as 
the ISACS make explicitly clear, these international 
standards are only meant to provide guidelines on 
how best to deal with certain situations in ideal 
circumstances. 
The ISACS were never meant to be applied as a fixed 
blueprint but rather to guide assessments and activ-
ities with the aim to provide useful information that 
allows practitioners to tailor activities that match 
the realities on the ground. Having recognized this, 
the assessment team and the Congolese authorities 
understood that the outcome of assessments, such as 
this PSSM study, should be used to inform policy and 
activities on the ground. 
Additionally, this study aims to identify competent 
authorities deemed to be in a position to help bring 
about more enduring solutions in the longer term 
and map out proper channels to get information or 
requests pertaining to PSSM to these authorities. 
Such requests could include basic requests for clear-
ance of obsolete or unstable munitions or weapons as 
well as a request to construct a whole new armoury 
or storage facility. In the future, armourers, logisti-
cians and stockpile managers should all ideally have 
access to a basic template on how to request PSSM-re-
lated activities and be aware of the correct channels, 
starting with their immediate superior all the way 
to the responsible officer at the Logistics Base in 
Kinshasa.8
6 \ Products derived from endangered species including ivory, rhino 
horn and pangolin scales are being trafficked at an unprecedented 
rate by armed groups and organized criminal gangs fueling an 
illegal trade valued at US $20 billion. Clear links have been estab-
lished between the use of illicit weapons by armed actors to poach 
protected, high-value animals on the one hand and, on the other, use 
profits generated to purchase additional weapons and ammunition. 
See BICC policy brief 1/2016 of June 2016. Additional information is 
available at www.lastdaysivory.com or www.traffick.org (accessed 20 
January 2016).
7 \ The limited nature and scope of this study did not permit any 
far-reaching claims regarding either the conflict dynamics in CAR 
and South Sudan, the trafficking of endangered species or the cross-
border trade in both regular and artisanally manufactured weapons 
and ammunition. The assessment team was aware of these dynamics 
and, where possible and permitted, paid attention to them but did 
not find adequate evidence to make any further assertions on these 
issues.
8 \ Despite several efforts to try and develop a basic handout or tool to 
facilitate communication through the hierarchy, the authors did 
not succeed in mapping out these channels. The development and 
dissemination of such a handout would bring greater clarity of roles 
and responsibilities and facilitate PSSM-related activities effectively 
and efficiently.
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The researchers blended several observation and 
interview techniques with other methods to collect 
data relevant to the evaluation and the appraisal of 
the context to which to tailor recommendations.
One means of collecting data pertaining to these 
practices consisted of formal semi-structured inter-
views. In addition to focusing on the risks posed 
by the weapons and munitions, interviewers also 
paid attention to the socio-economic dynamics and 
cultural context of the areas surrounding the storage 
facilities. These interviews tended to follow an asso-
ciative process that was nevertheless consistent in 
addressing a core set of pre-defined questions.9 The 
interviews were followed by a fact-checking process 
where the types and numbers of weapons and 
ammunition recorded in official registers were cross-
checked with the weapons and ammunition physi-
cally present in the armouries. Often, discrepancies 
in the registered details compared to the numbers 
and types of weapons recorded by the assessment 
team were found.
Fifty formal interviews were conducted10 with 
informants covering the entire range of ranks 
within the FARDC, from a general to several lieu-
tenant colonels (unit commanders) to non-commis-
sioned officers and enlisted men and women, as 
well as several members of the national police force 
(PNC). A considerable share of the interviews sought 
to establish narratives whereby the concerned 
actors explained perceived differences between the 
situation found in place (in terms of infrastructure, 
9 \ These questions mainly asked for the size of the division, the 
number of soldiers and guards at the site, the level of training 
available to the armourer and his capacity to manage the storage, 
maintenance and destruction or disposal of weapons and ammuni-
tions at the site. After the interviews, a technical assessment of the 
facilities was also carried out in parallel to an examination of the 
socio-economic context of the surrounding areas and communities. 
The interview guide and further details of the process are available 
on request.
10 \ Over 50 respondents participated in (semi-) structured interviews, 
on-site evaluations and/or validation feedback sessions in Kinshasa, 
Mbandaka, Bokala, Gbadolite and Mobayi. The information from 
these sources is presented in this study in a way that is not attrib-
utable to particular individuals, and further details are available on 
request.
A member of the assessment team in discussions with FARDC troops at 
the Bokala munitions storage facility in Mbandaka after an assessment 
of their armoury as part of the on-site validation process.
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facilities and practices) as compared to what they 
knew should be the case. The researchers also spoke 
with officers and service people informally, as and 
when possible, as well as with civilians living and/
or working in the immediate surroundings of the 
stockpile facilities. Most of the informants were 
open and willing to discuss all aspects of their work. 
Interviews were conducted in French. Informal 
interviews with civilians at Bokala camp, conducted 
in Lingala with a member of the CNC-ALPC delega-
tion acting as an interpreter, were an exception. The 
researchers wrote down the interviews and all other 
data in notebooks and summarized and digitalized 
major findings of the day’s interviews at the end of 
each day. 
They observed stockpile facilities and practices to 
establish in what aspect and to what extent practices 
found in armouries differ from international stand-
ards such as the ISACS and/or protocols that the 
authorities in the DRC have agreed to comply with, 
such as the Nairobi Protocol on the Problem of Illicit 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes 
Region and the Horn of Africa. By an order of the 
chief of staff of the army, the evaluation team was 
authorized to enter the armouries and ammunition 
depots and to count and record the number and type 
of weapons and ammunition stored in the facilities. 
As photography was permitted, a large body of visual 
material documenting these arms and ammuni-
tion was also collected. All photographs and visual 
material were catalogued and labelled at the end of 
each day.
A member of the assessment team examining a FARDC register of 
weapons meant to record withdrawals and returns from the armoury 
housed in President Mobutu’s former home in Gbadolite.
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11 \ Further details on methodology, software or specific tools used for 
this study are available in the MAG Technical Reports on Armouries 
(Evaluation Technique des rises des stocks d’armes et de munitions au 
Mandaka et Gbadolite, RDC, 2015) and the Bokala Ammunition Depot 
case study (Evaluation Technique du depot du munitions au camp de 
Bokala, 2015) that accompany this publication.
From a technical perspective, the purpose of these 
visits was to assess the level of risk and to identify 
the needs to improve the management of arms 
and ammunition stockpiles. The technical assess-
ment of the risks posed by the weapons or muni-
tions stored in the facility focused on the potential 
 socio-economic, infrastructural and humanitarian 
impact of an unintentional explosion or diversion 
of weapons and ammunition. While conducting the 
technical risk analysis, the researchers paid specific 
attention to the following factors:
 \  The physical condition of the weapons or 
ammunition depot itself in terms of safety and 
security;
 \  Practices related to the storage and safety of 
weapons and ammunition; 
 \  The physical condition of the weapons and 
ammunition as well as their number and type;
 \  The level of training and skills of the 
armourers or storekeepers responsible for 
the weapons or munitions storage facility, 
including their technical knowledge and the 
standards used to manage inventories and 
stockpiles;
 \  The impact of an unplanned explosion given 
the significant amount of high explosive 
contained in stockpiles of large calibre muni-
tions and the presence of civilian communities 
within the blast radius.
At each site, the researchers collected PSSM-relevant 
technical data from armouries and wrote it down in 
notebooks at the armouries. They then logged this 
data into Ammunition Stockpile Risk Assessment 
(ASRA) software designed by MAG to enable tech-
nical evaluations of the risks posed by munitions 
depots.
They measured the surface area of weapons and 
ammunition storage sites with an electronic meas-
uring device that could be also be used to calculate 
the dimensions of the walls and distances between 
the floor and ceiling. They recorded distances 
between buildings and inhabited areas necessary 
for blast impact calculations and used tools avail-
able as part of the UN Saferguard software package 
(in the framework of the International Ammuni-
tion Training Guidelines) for further calculations. 
Specific tools used to calculate blast impact radii and 
impacts on surrounding communities included the 
Kingery-Bulmash Blast Parameter Calculator, Quan-
tity-Distance mapping tools and Explosion Danger 
Area Calculator.11
Prior to travelling to northern Congo, the authors 
analyzed primary source materials (legal instru-
ments, policy papers and reports). This preliminary 
stage in the research process helped place in context 
the socio-economic, humanitarian and institutional 
context for PSSM practices in the DRC, and identify 
the actors most relevant to these practices. These 
findings are summarized in the section on Context 
and method (p. 11 ff.).
Despite all efforts to prepare the visits to the stock-
pile facilities before the research team left for the 
field, a substantial part of administrative and related 
formalities still had to be addressed upon arrival. 
As custom demanded, a large number of meetings 
needed to be held with local authorities in accord-
ance with local protocol. These encounters offered 
an opportunity for the team to present the aim of 
the visit, identify specific research questions, and 
formally demand authorization and assistance from 
higher ranked officials responsible for the stockpile 
facilities to be visited. 
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Validation process 
Preliminary meetings gradually developed into an 
integral element in the research process cycle, in the 
sense that those giving authorization and arranging 
for practical assistance at the sites were keen to hear 
the team’s preliminary findings as presented in 
validation meetings during and immediately after 
the site visits in northern DRC.12 A separate series of 
meetings was also organized with local interested 
stakeholders other than the military or security 
actors. These allowed incorporating concerns from 
local civil society and international humanitarian 
organizations active on the ground.13 Immediately 
after returning from northern DRC, the series of 
validation meetings was completed with formal 
gatherings in Kinshasa at and on behalf of the 
National SALW Commission, the CNC-ALPC on 12 
October 2015, and with international community 
representatives on 13 October 2015.14
Having included a large range of different actors into 
the process, the different types of meetings allowed 
for multiple evaluation–validation cycles providing 
the team with a wealth of input of their reactions, 
comments and other feedback that have been taken 
on board in the drafting of this Knowledge Note.
Overview of sites visited and interviews conducted
A team composed by BICC, MAG and GRIP staff 
conducted a PSSM assessment in Equateur and 
Nord-Oubangui Provinces in September and October 
2015. The PSSM assessment was facilitated by the 
CNC-ALPC (both staff from its seat in Kinshasa and 
members of the CNC-ALPC “antenna” in Mbandaka). 
A preliminary identification of the number and the 
specifics of the stockpiles to be visited in Equateur 
and Nord-Oubangui Provinces proved impossible on 
the basis of the information available to the team: 
this identification process, the negotiation of access 
to the facilities and the organization of the actual 
visits could only be accomplished in situ. Site visits 
were conducted in collaboration with local FARDC 
and PNC personnel assigned to the specific locales 
and stockpiles visited.
12 \ Such ‘local’ debriefing sessions took place on 23 September 2015 
at Bokala camp, and on 24 September at the état-major des forces 
navales (Marines Headquarters) in the heart of Mbandaka. Many 
of those participating in these sessions were also among the 
twenty-four participants of the restitution and validation meeting 
organized at the Mbandaka CNC-antenna on 8 October 2015.
13 \ These stakeholder meetings took place on 6 October 2015 at the 
Maison de la Femme in Mbandaka, and on 30 September 2015 at the 
UNHCR headquarters in Gbadolite respectively.
14 \ A validation meeting for 13 invited representatives of international 
organizations, military attachés and advisors from (potential) donor 
countries.
The assessment team in discussions with representatives from the 
FARDC, PNC, Eco-Gardes and the local CNC-ALPC antenna as part of  
the final local-level validation of findings in Mandaka before  
the validation process in Kinshasa. \ Photo by Captain Budri Adobe 
FARDC / BICC
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The research team visited 20 sites where arms and/
or ammunitions are stored. Some of these stockpiles 
were assigned to PNC, and most belonged to FARDC, 
yet all were found significantly similar in content. 
These were typically a mixture of several different 
types of military-grade weapons—mostly assault 
rifles—and assorted ammunitions, accompanied by 
a small stock of larger calibre munitions (mortars 
and rockets). FARDC and PNC stockpile facilities and 
PSSM practices in this respect were found suffi-
ciently similar to be amenable to a single evaluation 
report. 
The technical report prepared by MAG’s technical 
field manager assesses 17 of the visited sites. Of the 
remaining three sites, one was of such a temporary 
nature that the small collection of arms allotted to 
PNC was literally passed from the hands of one guard 
to the next in front of the Gbadolite police headquar-
ters. The other two armouries, the 11eme Groupe-
ment Naval in Mbandaka and the PNC armouries 
in Mobayi-Mbongo in the Nord-Oubangui Province 
located on the border with Central African Republic 
will be presented later in this study as separate case 
studies.
Although munitions, including larger calibre muni-
tions, were found at almost all sites, only one site in 
the Mbandaka area was found to be designated as the 
“munitions depot” where different forces, including 
the PNC, store back-up munitions at Bokala camp. As 
a significant amount of explosive material was found 
at this site, it became subject of a separate technical 
analysis. The site is also reported on at length as a 
case study in the section on PSSM in Practice of this 
study (p. 28 ff.). 
The team conducted interviews at these sites and 
in their immediate surroundings. Information 
was also gleaned from meetings with a wide range 
of officers in charge of the personnel guarding 
these stocks. Some meetings took place at the 
commanding officers’ offices rather than at the sites 
for practical as well as security reasons as many 
of the facilities were not ventilated, poorly lit and 
the presence of munitions that the MAG technical 
field manager deemed unstable made it unsafe to 
stay longer in their proximity than necessary. The 
assessment team recorded several RPG7 munitions 
found without the safety band. As static electricity 
from the human body is capable of triggering 
the piezo-electric fuse employed on these RPG7 
warheads, certain precautions are employed while 
dealing with such munitions. These include simple 
measures such as assuming a ‘prone/ praying posi-
tion’ for at least fifteen seconds with palms touching 
the earth to discharge most static electricity from 
the body before attempting to touch, examine or 
move such munitions. This is a useful example that 
illustrates one of the recurring problems in the DRC: 
Little or no knowledge of how to handle, inspect or 
store specific munitions due to inadequately trained 
personnel can prove to be a dangerous combina-
tion. Specific training is therefore a prerequisite for 
putting in place a responsible and safe PSSM culture. 
Several RPG7 munitions found without the safety band and in  
unstable condition, sometimes stored alongside highly explosive 
 phosphorous charges (third from right).
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High-level representatives from Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, the DRC and Libya (l. to r.) sign a joint communique on  
priority activities under the aegis of the Sub-Regional Arms Control Mechanism in Khartoum, Sudan in November 2014.
Legal framework and policy
This section provides an overview of the DRC’s national framework on arms 
control as well as an overview of four sub-regional mechanisms applicable to the 
DRC. Background to the establishment of the national authority on arms control, 
the CNC-ALPC, as well as the current Congolese National Action Plan is provided, 
specifically addressing PSSM-relevant sections. Finally, mechanisms intended 
to coordinate action on PSSM and small arms control such as the PSSM Working 
Group are evaluated, highlighting the need to translate theoretical knowledge, 
training and SOPs on PSSM into effective action.
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Legislation
According to the government of the DRC, the produc-
tion of arms (including ‘artisanal production’), the 
possession, transfer and stockpiling of arms and 
ammunitions on its territory is not adequately regu-
lated. The applicable legal framework is set by Ordi-
nance-Law 85-035 of 3 September 1985 on the regime 
for weapons and ammunition, and Ordinance-Law 
85-212 of 3 September 1985 on measures for imple-
menting that law. These instruments have been 
described as “deficient and not suited to the context 
of the conflict” that the DRC went through, and as 
“not adapted to international and regional standards 
or to the contemporary context in the DRC” (Moreau, 
2011, p. 32).  
Efforts have been underway since 2004 to update 
and strengthen the legal framework on arms control 
in the DRC. In 2010, these efforts led the National 
Assembly to adopt a “Draft law on the prevention, 
control and reduction of small arms and light 
weapons and munitions in the DRC”, and to send 
it to the Senate for debate. By 2013, the Senate had 
approved a draft arms control law, which however 
differs from the draft previously approved by the 
National Assembly. At the time of the assessment, in 
the autumn of 2015, the discrepancies between the 
two drafts had not been resolved and no consolidated 
version was in the pipeline for approval. 
These legislative efforts are also prompted by the 
2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and 
Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the 
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. The DRC 
signed and in 2005 ratified the Nairobi Protocol that 
is a sub-regional instrument to implement the UN 
Programme of Action on SALW (PoA). The Protocol 
contains provisions on safe disposal and covers 
several related aspects of PSSM. 
A second—and in fact older—sub-regional instru-
ment on SALW control that includes the DRC is the 
Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition 
and other Related Materials that the Heads of State 
of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) adopted in 2001 immediately after the UN 
PoA came into being. As the DRC is a member of the 
SADC, the country’s legislative framework would 
have come under scrutiny in light of efforts to 
implement that Protocol, such as to try and harmo-
nize its member states’ SALW-related legislation. 
In the meantime, Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) have been proposed and adopted on the SADC 
Protocol that entailed capacity-building for record-
keeping and the disposal of state-owned firearms. 
A third sub-regional instrument relevant to the DRC 
is the so-called Kinshasa Convention, the Central 
African Convention for the Control of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, Parts and 
Components that can be used for their Manufac-
ture, Repair or Assembly It was negotiated by the 
United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on 
Security Questions in Central Africa (UNSAC) and 
was adopted on 30 April 2010 at a meeting held in 
Kinshasa. This instrument is not as yet in force, as it 
still needs to be ratified by two-thirds of its signa-
tory states, including the DRC.15 By its signature of 
the instrument, the DRC is nevertheless understood 
to be committed to the provisions of the Kinshasa 
Convention, such as on PSSM, registration and the 
safe disposal of SALW.16
15 \ In its 2010 report to the PoA-ISS, the DRC stated that it had already 
ratified the Kinshasa Convention. A few months later, that same 
information was copied in the NAP. However, five years on, there 
was no evidence of the DRC having ratified the instrument. The 
assertion that the ratification was deposited was later denied by staff 
involved in the CNC, that is the Commission that initially reported 
the ratification. Further reporting to the PoA-ISS Secretariat is antic-
ipated to rectify that previous reporting.
16 \ Respectively by Articles 16 and 15 of the Kinshasa Convention.
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A fourth arrangement for UN PoA implementation 
that affects the DRC is the Sub-regional Arms Control 
Mechanism (SARCOM). SARCOM was founded in 
May 2012 in Khartoum, Sudan. Representatives from 
the DRC along with the Central African Republic, 
Chad, Libya and Sudan committed to the Khartoum 
Declaration on the control of SALW on the western 
borders of Sudan. They were later joined by South 
Sudan as an observer state. This Declaration high-
lighted priority needs of member states attempting 
to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive arms 
control approach in the region, which included arms 
registration and marking of civilian, illicitly owned 
SALW, more responsible PSSM practice and strength-
ening community security and arms control (CSAC) 
initiatives. The interim secretariat of SARCOM 
currently operates from Khartoum, Sudan.
DRC National Commission and  
Action Plan
In line with the prerequisites of the 2001 UN PoA 
and the sub-regional instruments to further imple-
mentation of the UN PoA, the Arrêt Interministe-
riel n° 020/2008 of 30 May 2008 foresaw a National 
Commission for the Control of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons and Armed Violence Reduction 
(CNC-ALPC). 
This National SALW Commission was created 
to serve as a platform to coordinate all activities 
undertaken as part of the DRC’s efforts to combat the 
illicit proliferation of small arms. It is placed under 
the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior and 
Security and is assisted by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs as well as the Ministry of Defence. It consists 
of an inter-ministerial assembly that is responsible 
for setting priorities and steering the country’s 
fight against SALW proliferation. To this end, the 
Commission has drawn up a National Action Plan 
(NAP) that defines the DRC’s policy for tackling its 
SALW problem. A survey funded by UNDP to take 
stock of civilian arms held in a handful provinces 
in eastern DRC,17 reportedly fed into the design of 
the NAP. There is little evidence that this survey 
was complemented by a more encompassing, truly 
national survey or needs assessment of all the 
nation’s SALW-control related challenges, to inform 
the DRC’s plan for the development of national 
policy and activities for the 2012–2016 period (NAP 
2012-2016). The drafting process of this NAP was 
supported in various ways by the Regional Centre on 
Small Arms (RECSA), and it has reportedly also taken 
on board perceptions, opinions and expert advice of 
a wide range of national and international actors, 
including (some) members of the DRC’s legislative 
power, the Minister of the Interior and Security, and 
the Minister of Defence, members of civil society, 
and UNDP. The latter, moreover, funded a feasibility 
study on the creation of regional antennas for the 
CNC-ALPC.
The NAP is not sanctioned by way of a specific law, 
but is seen as an authoritative expression of the 
governmental initiative to develop a national policy 
to contain the proliferation of SALW in the DRC. 
The CNC-ALPC published and printed a considerable 
number of copies of this plan. Copies of the publica-
tion are freely available in the DRC.
17 \ The study was made in 2009-2010 by a consortium of BICC and GRIP. 
An English language summary was published as Berghezan & 
Zeebroek, 2011.
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The current National Action Plan of the DRC to control and manage 
small arms and light weapons first published in July 2011 is set to  
expire in 2016.
PSSM in the National Action Plan  
2012–2016
The NAP 2012–2016 contains a section with the 
caption “Strengthening the security of the stock-
piles”. The activities programmed in this section 
seek to “strengthen the capacities for managing, 
marking and securing the stockpile of arms and 
ammunitions”; they also envisage that an “evalua-
tion of the State’s stockpile facilities” be conducted 
and that “facilities where the arms are stored that 
belong to the State’s defence and security forces” be 
constructed and/or refurbished.18 The latter action is 
expected to result in the construction of two stock-
pile facilities. A firm assertion that the “FARDC, 
PNC and members of the CNC-ALPC are capacitated 
in this field” is filled out in the box on the expected 
outcome of the capacity-building action.19 
The NAP indicates that implementation of these 
PSSM-related activities is contingent on the availa-
bility of “political will” as well as success in raising 
funds to cover the budgeted costs,20 to the tune of a 
total of US $1,200,000: US $250,000 for the organiza-
tion of ten training sessions (two training sessions 
a year, over the entire five-year term); US $200,000 
to conduct a national evaluation of stockpile facili-
ties,21 and US $750,000 for rehabilitation /construc-
tion of stockpile facilities. A an additional budget 
line, earmarked for transporting obsolete arms to 
a site for destruction, which some consider a core 
PSSM activity can also be found under this heading. 
Although considerable, these costs are comparatively 
modest compared to over US $2 million that the 
NAP seeks to allot to (travel to) events to commem-
orate key dates in the creation of the international 
arms control regimes, and to over US $14 million 
the NAP proposed the international community 
invest in broadly described activities for education 
and awareness-raising activities in the broad field 
of arms control and violence reduction, including 
capacity-building of the Congolese civil society and 
professionalization of its news media. 
The actors the NAP tasks with specified PSSM activ-
ities are the Presidency, the FARDC Chief of Staff, 
the Ministries of Defence and that of the Interior 
and Security as well as the CNC–ALPC, UNDP, the 
Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), which 
is the secretariat to the Nairobi Protocol, and the 
humanitarian NGO, MAG. For the national evalua-
tion on stockpile facilities and rehabilitation of these 
facilities, the NAP additionally refers to the General 
Inspector of the PNC and to the Chiefs of Staff of 
both the police and the armed forces. 
18 \ These actions are labelled in the NAP as « Renforcement des 
capacités sur la gestion, le marquage et la sécurisation des stocks 
d’armes et munitions », « Conduire une évaluation nationale sur les 
infrastructures étatiques de stockage d’armes » and « Construction/
Rehabilitation de magasins de stockage d’armes pour les armes des 
forces de défenses et de l’ordre public », respectively.
19 \ «Les forces de défense, de l’ordre et les membres de la CNC-ALPC sont 
formées».
20 \ Section on stockpile management budgeted on NAP p. 67.
21 \ The envisaged ‘évaluation nationale sur les infrastructures étatiques de 
stockage des armes’ is apparently not to cover munitions stockpiling, 
nor practices and approaches in and around such facilities. As such, 
its scope clearly differs from the present evaluation report.
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PSSM working group, training and 
SOPs
Prior to the drafting of the NAP, a DRC PSSM 
working group was formed and conducted regular 
meetings. Although the NAP lists several members 
of that group in the section it devotes to PSSM 
activities, this PSSM working group is not explicitly 
mentioned/ referred to. Nor does the PSSM section 
in the NAP refer to the European Union’s Security 
Sector Reform programme in the DRC (EUSEC–RD 
Congo), deployed to inter alia conduct PSSM-related 
activities. Since it began work in the DRC in 2005, 
EUSEC has built at least ten stockpile facilities and 
contributed quite significantly to the strengthening 
of the DRC’s security actors’ PSSM capacity. From 
2011 until 2014, EUSEC additionally chaired the PSSM 
working group. As EUSEC scaled down its opera-
tions in 2015, the chair of the PSSM working group 
was transferred to the FARDC and co-chaired by the 
US embassy. Little evidence is available to suggest 
the CNC-ALPC has participated in meetings of the 
working group since that time. A reliable source 
informed the assessment team that the CNC-ALPC 
had not received invitations to attend PSSM working 
group meetings since its chair was transferred to the 
FARDC.  
PSSM Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the 
DRC have been proscribed in documents such as 
Procedure et technique classe V Aide-mémoire logistique 
du Bataillon (217 p., 2011) and Aide-mémoire logistique 
du Bataillon (97 p., 2014) that FARDC and EUSEC RD 
Congo jointly published. These documents them-
selves were found to be stored under lock and key in 
the desks of certain armourers in pristine condition. 
This leads to two observations: First, important 
PSSM activities occur in the DRC relatively inde-
pendently of a National Commission created to 
coordinate all SALW-control related policy and 
activity in the country, including PSSM. This 
reiterates the need for more effective coordination 
amongst national authorities responsible for small 
arms control including PSSM and the need to operate 
with greater transparency and cooperation towards 
jointly developing a culture of responsible and safe 
PSSM practices. 
While aide-memoires and textbooks containing valuable PSSM 
 knowledge exist, such as this PSSM manual published by EUSEC, 
 transferring the knowledge contained in these books to practice and 
action still needs to be achieved.
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Second, even though the aide-memoires and text-
books containing valuable PSSM knowledge exist, 
the knowledge contained in these books to practice 
and action still needs to be implemented, which 
will take time and commitment. To systematically 
minimize the gap between theory and action and to 
incorporate the knowledge acquired in trainings and 
in handbooks into arms and ammunition manage-
ment is therefore crucial to building a culture of 
responsible PSSM practice. Effective coordination 
at the senior military levels and high-level political 
support to ensure the right training opportunities 
are made available to the right people will help 
create a conducive environment to facilitating this 
behavioural change. Making sure that the relevant, 
responsible actors who conduct PSSM on a daily 
basis, such as the armourers, logisticians and stock-
pile managers, take advantage of training opportu-
nities and make a conscious effort to implement this 
valuable knowledge on the ground is a first step in 
this direction. More than any external action, this 
requires a conscious shift in attitudes on the ground 
and a willingness to drastically change current 
practices towards a more systematic and prudent 
approach. This is only possible if the relevant 
authorities take the initiative to cultivate a culture of 
responsible PSSM and arms control.
As of the autumn of 2015, PSSM activities in the DRC 
were placed under the highest presidential authority. 
This presidential decision was already seen to have 
an impact on procedures such as the authorization 
of destruction of weapons found obsolete, and more 
changes may be on their way that would call for 
clarification and possible rethinking of the current 
position and remit of the CNC-ALPC in PSSM activi-
ties, irrespective of the NAP.
To thoroughly assess an armoury, weapons were cleaned, categorized 
and counted before verifying their numbers with the data recorded in 
the registers. FARDC armoury, Mbandaka.
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The assessment team examines a collection of RPG7 warheads, many of which are stored directly on the floor next to  
flammable phosphorous and not equipped with a security mechanism. Bokala munition depot, October 2015.
Findings and analysis of PSSM practices and 
approaches in north-western DRC
This section deals with findings related to the management of weapons, ammu-
nition and equipment. Similarities, recurring patterns and specific findings are 
recorded paying particular attention to procedures, processes and communication 
channels. Specialized PSSM training opportunities are highlighted as a necessary 
precondition for developing a safe PSSM culture. Practices around accountability 
of withdrawal and return of weapons and ammunition are observed and comple-
mentary activities on weapons marking and record-keeping are noted. Finally, 
observations on safety and security of stockpiles including regular inspections, the 
risk of diversion/ theft, cross-border trade and destruction of surplus or unstable 
weapons and munitions are also identified.
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Management of weapons, ammunition 
and equipment 
Visits to all identified SALW stockpiles in the wider 
Mbandaka and Gbadolite areas, allotted to various 
forces of the armed forces of the DRC (FARDC),21 to 
the national police (PNC), and to paramilitary forces 
such as the Eco-Gardes that patrol the Mbandaka 
botanical garden, revealed their contents to be 
similar. 
Identifying patterns in arms and ammunition sites
PNC posts typically hold a limited number of mili-
tary-grade assault rifles supplied from (local) FARDC
stockpiles, the clear majority of which are Kalash-
nikov variants chambered for 7.62 x .39 rounds as 
well as an assorted number of M16/AR-15’s and FN 
FAL rifles. Often these weapons are damaged or in far
from optimal condition. A common claim encoun-
tered by the evaluation team during visits to the PNC
was that they were not provided with specialized
police equipment and they had to make do with
military style weapons that carried lethal firepower.
But, after visiting a number of PNC armouries the
evaluation team recorded the presence of crowd-
control riot gear, body armour and protective shields
and helmets as well as pump-action shot guns
capable of firing rubber bullets as well as smoke and
flash grenades. This specialized equipment, which
appeared to be in mint condition, has yet to be
distributed to the frontier positions.
The team observed that the PNC appeared to be
experiencing a shortage of ammunition, even in
frontier positions located along the border with
the Central African Republic (CAR) as described in
the visual case study on the Mobayi-Mobangi PNC
armouries (see section on PSSM in Practice, p. 44 ff.).
The problem appears to have more to do with effec-
tive distribution of material, particularly to remote
outposts, as well as the management of existing
resources than merely a lack of specialized equip-
ment or a drought of ammunition as explained in
the next section on procedures.
The Eco-Gardes are a paramilitary force that receives
basic training from the FARDC in order to provide
security at wildlife protection sites and help curb the
illicit trade in wildlife and natural resources such as
timber. The Eco-Gardes are supplied with a limited
number of Kalashnikov-style weapons from the
FARDC stockpiles.
The PNC and the Eco-Gardes made it clear that they
are dependent on the better equipped FARDC soldiers
in the event of an escalation of the security situation.
New, unused Chinese manufactured 12-gauge shotguns were recorded in PNC armouries stored in their original plastic wrapping (r.) in  
front of several boxes of unused and undistributed 5.56mm ammunition and RPG7 warheads (l.).
22 \ The navy, the army and the air force in Mbandaka
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In comparison, FARDC positions are much better
equipped and hold a much wider range of weapons
including artillery and heavier weapons. In terms
of small arms, most sites visited contain a mix of
a majority of Kalashnikov variants including the
AK47 and Type 56 variants, AK76, AK-M as well as a
limited number of Uzi 9mm machine pistols, FN-FAL
and Galil rifles or heavier calibre machine guns
such as the MG40 and a number of RPG-7 warheads.
The team was also informed that the FN FAL rifles
currently in stock are stored mostly for ceremonial
use as they are chambered for the 7.62 x 51mm NATO
cartridge which is only available in limited stocks
making them unavailable for regular service.
ciently significant to allow for identification of basic 
patterns found at most visited sites:
 \  Stocks of both arms and ammunition, 
including mortars and other larger calibre 
munitions, were present in most visited sites.24 
Munitions were not guaranteed to be sorted 
by calibre or by lots, year of manufacture or 
batches. 
 \  Weapons and live ammunition were often 
stored together rather than separately or 
in locked containers within a larger secure 
storage space, which creates a dangerous 
environment as the weapons are ‘active’. This 
practice also carries significantly higher risk 
as weapons and compatible ammunition 
would be available to anyone who has access to 
this site.25
 \  In several FARDC and PNC facilities, maga-
zines were found containing live ammunition, 
often lying next to or on top of rifles. In quite 
a few locations, magazines containing live 
ammunition were found loaded into the stored 
rifles.26 These unsafe storage and handling 
practices pose a danger for staff working in 
the armouries as they are at risk of a loaded 
weapon accidentally discharging during 
routine cleaning or handling.27 Further, from 
a technical or functional perspective, these 
unsafe practices also have a negative effect 
on the lifespan of the magazine: When maga-
zines are stored loaded with ammunition this 
stresses the master spring of the magazine, 
which in turn makes the magazine itself less 
reliable.
23 \ The quality of available facilities and (quantitive) specifics of what 
these contain are detailed in the Technical Reports accompanying 
this study.
24 \ Quantitative specifics are found in the Technical Reports.
25 \ Storing weapons and ammunition separately is another example of a 
low-cost measure that would vastly decrease the risk of diversion
26 \ This is particularly disconcerting as safe weapons handling prac-
tices are far from the norm in the DRC and in the wider region. The  
team observed an over-reliance on the safety mechanism—which 
may or may not be engaged—rather than observing basic safety 
protocols such as pointing the weapon in a safe direction.
27 \ This example clearly illustrates why responsible PSSM practices 
benefit the soldiers who are engaging with dangerous material on a 
daily basis and whose lives depend on this sensitive equipment and 
munitions functioning reliably and accurately. 
A number of Belgian manufactured Fabrique Nationale FN FAL rifles
chambered for 7.62mm ammunition, large quantities of which are
usually no longer stockpiled in the DRC.
The FARDC has incorporated arms that they report-
edly found discarded on the streets after prior 
conflicts. Several of these weapons were then made 
available to the PNC.
The emphasis of this study is on evaluating PSSM 
practices rather than on the quality of available 
facilities and the specific nature of their contents,23 
without downplaying the degree to which the latter 
determine such practices. The similarity and links 
between the different forces’ stockpiles are suffi-
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 \  Different types of incompatible munitions 
were found stored together creating hazardous 
situations, often without even being separated 
in wooden crates. RPG7 shoulder launched 
rocket projectiles were routinely found in 
piles on the floor next to phosphorous or 
other munitions or fuses that were deliber-
ately designed to be highly flammable. This is 
discussed in greater detail as part of the case 
studies on Bokala (see p. 44 ff.).
 \  The assessment team recorded several 
instances where weapons and/or ammunition 
were also found to be routinely stored along-
side other materials including specialized 
equipment for law enforcement purposes such 
as riot gear or other mechanical spare parts for 
vehicles including spare tires and fuel which 
could prove to be a fire hazard. 
 \  It was also the norm rather than the exception 
to find weapons and ammunition stored along-
side food items such as bags of rice, jerrycans 
containing cooking oil or other provisions. The 
common denominator of all items contained 
in such storage facilities is a perceived value 
that merits them to be placed in a space that 
can be locked. The conjunction of all these 
materials in one unventilated storage room, 
along with flammable material, such as wood 
or paper, is unsafe.
 \  The fact that sensitive munitions and weapons 
were stored with food items creates its own 
set of complexities. Besides the fire hazard, 
this could also lead to the uncontrollable 
prevalence of rodents which can eat through 
wooden ammunition cases and paletts used to 
support piles of these cases, in effect rendering 
entire storage sites unsafe. This is another 
example where simple measures, such as basic 
cleanliness, can vastly improve the security 
and life expectancy of weapons and munitions 
at absolutely no cost. This does not depend 
on external intervention from Kinshasa or 
further afield; in fact it is totally dependent on 
the initiative of the officers responsible for the 
upkeep of the armouries or munitions depots. 
 \  Rather than keeping such dangerous ammu-
nition in their SALW storage facilities, the 
different forces in the Mbandaka area could 
transfer these to the space assigned to each 
of them at Camp Bokala, which has taken up 
this role since 2007 when a fire destroyed the 
munitions depot at Camp Ngashi (see case 
study below). While the case study in this 
report draws attentions to specific problems 
that exist at Bokala, the advantage of having a 
dedicated weapons and munitions site is worth 
taking into account. 
Weapons and ammunition are often stored together with vehicle 
parts, food or flammable items in contravention of standard operating 
 procedures.
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FARDC troops surround a member of the technical assessment team as 
he examines the register of withdrawal and return of weapons
Identifying procedures, processes and 
 communication channels
Supplies to stockpiles throughout the DRC’s terri-
tory are governed by legal instruments that define 
what entities can hold which categories of arms and 
how items can be imported, transported and other-
wise supplied to specific locations on that territory. 
Within the regulatory framework currently in place, 
the “maison militaire du chef d’état” plays a central role. 
It identifies the Congolese security forces needs in 
terms of arms and related equipment. Created by 
Article 11 of Décret n° 019/2003, of 2 March 2003, this 
office is staffed exclusively with FARDC officers, and 
works directly under the President of the republic. It 
also assures the link between the Presidency and the 
Ministry of Defence, as well as the état-major of the 
FARDC and all concerned forces and services. Based 
on the directives of the supreme command of the 
FARDC, its role is to manage the procurement and 
the purchase of new armament, before this can be 
distributed to troops within the territory. Only the 
President and the Minister of Defence can authorize 
transfers of military grade arms and ammunitions 
into, through and from the DRC’s territory.
In practice, this mechanism and logistical supply 
chain does not always guarantee effective stock-
pile management. Visits to sites in Equateur and 
Nord-Oubangui Provinces brought little clarity about 
why and how certain items came to be contained 
in FARDC and PNC stockpile facilities and why 
others are scarce or absent. The presence of rockets 
and mortars found in many of the visited sites is 
particularly difficult to explain in terms of ‘needs' or 
'routine use’ by the forces in whose armouries these 
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were found. The most common explanation received 
by the team was that they had been ‘left there 
temporarily’ by a soldier or had been ‘found’ at the 
site as remnants of prior conflict in the area, when 
they were brought into the area and used by armed 
structures that demobilized after the war.
As opposed to SALW, landmines and related explo-
sive remnants of war were disposed of in some 
areas of Equateur Province, with the assistance of 
specialized organizations such as UNMAS and MAG. 
Procedures were put in place to channel requests 
for the removal of these explosive materials; these 
procedures are also applicable to the removal and 
controlled disposal of obsolete weapons from govern-
ment stocks. The assessment team however found 
that those in charge of managing stockpiles that 
contain such materials do not know these proce-
dures, which results in the continued presence of 
obsolete or unusable weapons.
The management of arms and ammunition distri-
bution is another example that would benefit from 
clearer channels of communication. Munitions 
scarcity at the Mobayi-Mbongo police station coin-
cided with the presence of a relatively large amount 
of ammunition at PNC facilities in Mbandaka, the 
capital of Equateur Province. Difficulties in trans-
porting stocks from Mandaka to Gbadolite and 
further towards the frontier with CAR appear to 
coincide with an apparent ignorance of procedures 
and channels resulting in the inefficient distribution 
of ammunition stocks even to sensitive frontier posi-
tions.28 The evaluation team documented instances 
where policemen operating along the border with 
CAR only had three rounds of ammunition in their 
weapons in stark contrast to policemen in Kinshasa 
who had a full thirty-round magazine and, in many 
cases, even a spare, fully loaded magazine in reserve. 
Finally, as explained in the previous section, the 
weapons themselves in service with the police are 
in far from optimal condition, and even these are 
limited in number. In the wider Gbadolite area, the 
number of such arms is limited—reportedly one rifle 
for every ten policemen, and even less pistols.29
PSSM training opportunities:  
Specialized training for specialist roles
Despite the fact that materials documenting PSSM 
standard operating procedures are fairly readily 
available and that for decades, various actors, 
including the FARDC, have and continue to organize 
specialized PSSM trainings in many locations in 
the DRC, MAG’s technical assessment reveals that 
personnel in charge of the visited stockpiles have 
at best insufficient PSSM-specific training, and in 
many cases no specific training at all. At the same 
time, at many sites, personnel other than those 
in charge of the armouries appeared to have more 
adequate training—especially officers higher up in 
the forces’ hierarchy (PNC and FARDC). The eval-
uation team encountered several superior officers 
who were able to recite rules and procedures upon 
request, yet found no evidence they had helped 
ensure such procedures were known and imple-
mented by the men under their responsibility, 
nor that these men (and women) were sent out to 
28 \ The Mobayi-Mobangui PNC station chief asked the BICC/MAG/
GRIP team to transmit to “Kinshasa” his request that munitions be 
supplied.
29 \ Information obtained at the PNC état major in Gbadolite on 
29 September 2015.
Specialized trainings to build capacity on PSSM are offered by several 
organizations. Here, African ‘instructor trainees’ receive PSSM training 
at the IPSTC in Nairobi, Kenya, in April 2015. The course is facilitated by 
BICC, RECSA, MSAG and the Verification Centre of the German military.
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adequate training programmes. Further, the role 
of an armourer is not sought after as the person 
in charge of the armoury takes on the unenviable 
responsibility of managing a facility already fraught 
with risks and problems.
FARDC organizes trainings out of their own means 
or in cooperation with external assistance provided 
by organizations such as EUSEC-DRC and in bilateral 
cooperation programmes with the governments of 
France, Belgium and the United States of America 
amongst others.30 It is in this context that FARDC 
and EUSEC co-published the manuals Procedure 
et Technique Classe V Aide-mémoire Logistique du 
Bataillon (217 p., 2011) and Aide-mémoire Logistique du 
Bataillon (97 p., 2014). Other external actors organ-
ized PSSM-related training programmes relatively 
independently, as exemplified by the United States’ 
organization of a “train the trainers” programme. 
Organizations such as MAG are another source of 
PSSM training available to the DRC. 
The National Commission should also be responsible 
for identifying training opportunities and liaising 
with regional organizations such as RECSA and the 
International Peace Support Training Centre based 
in Nairobi that conduct PSSM training of trainers 
courses with support from BICC and the German 
Federal Foreign Office, the African Union, the 
German military and the Multinational Small Arms 
and Ammunition Group.
In consequence, one of the challenges the eval-
uation team identified is that trainings needs to 
better target those personnel directly responsible 
for the management of weapons and munitions 
facilities. These trainings should therefore prioritize 
armourers, stockpile managers and logisticians 
rather than allow the training opportunities to be 
captured by superior officers. Second, once trained, 
greater efforts need to be made that qualified 
personnel remain in charge of the armouries and 
munitions facilities rather than being transferred 
to other roles.31 These trained personnel should also 
play a key role in training additional staff in order 
to build PSSM capacity at the national level. Finally, 
staff from all branches of the armed forces should 
be provided with training opportunities, avoiding 
the monopolisation of opportunities by any specific 
branch.
30 \ No open source impact assessment of the 10 years EUSEC-DRC 
programme was available at the time of the mission.
31 \ At one site, containing a rather large stockpile ascribed to the naval 
forces in Mbandaka, the person in charge of the armoury reported 
having trained in the United States. Although most arms in that 
particular stockpile were found to be kept in good condition, they 
were not stored safely. This is detailed in the visual case study below 
(p. 44 ff.). 
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An officer examines two rounds of ammunition at a small Congolese  
Air Force outpost in Gbadolite.
Accountability
Stock reports: ammunitions and arms
Most, but not all, visited sites had some sort of 
inventory that listed types and volumes of arms and 
ammunitions assumed in stock. Its quality (that is, 
completeness and veracity) however differed from 
site to site. In the case of one particularly modest 
stockpile, an envelope containing an updated copy of 
the inventory was cautiously retrieved from a secure 
box. The envelope was ready to be sent to Kinshasa, 
as the person in charge indicated she must do every 
six months. No evidence of similar diligence was 
found at other storage facilities, where the MAG 
technical field manager’s comparison of the listed 
inventory with the actual holdings tended to reveal 
discrepancies. Arms were also more often than not 
seen to be mislabelled on the inventory. In several 
cases, more arms were found in stock than were 
listed in the inventory.
It is worth noting that despite its flaws, the fact 
that this system exists is already an improvement 
compared to practices prevalent in storage sites in 
different countries in the region where, often, there 
is no recording system at all.
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Withdrawal and return
Most of the visited sites had in place some system for 
following the arms and ammunitions through the 
hands of personnel—whether it is a booklet to note 
down the ‘in-and-out’ of weapons, locally known as 
a “cahier de perception”, or loose-sheeted forms that 
personnel fill out upon withdrawal of a piece of 
armament.32 Often, however, the cahier de perception 
was not found in the armoury but had to be procured 
by the personnel in charge from a different location. 
The fact that there was a booklet did not guarantee 
that it was filled out as prescribed by procedures 
both FARDC and PNC are to follow.
In the particular case of the newly installed 
 Gbadolite PNC état major, the assessment team 
observed that the person ending his duty directly 
passed on the very modest stock of arms to the 
person replacing him or her—the changing of the 
guard. This procedure took place on the street in 
front of a former housing block where the PNC EM is 
currently seated. The arms never made it to a storage 
cabinet or room in that building.33 The names of the 
personnel on duty were noted, with reference to date 
and time. It appeared that no specifics concerning 
the arm and number of bullets given to those on 
duty were registered in this book.34
32 \ The system was found in one Mbandaka PNC armoury. Several 
different versions were recorded of how the system was supposed to 
work. According to some, the form documenting an “out” was signed 
and then kept by the person as proof having returned the arm. In 
another version, the forms were stored at the armoury. A highly 
incomplete folder of forms was found in the armoury.
33 \ Observation by one person of the assessment team and two repre-
sentatives of CNC-Kinshasa, after visit to the Gbadolite PNC EM on 
29 September 2015.
34 \ A comment from the evaluation team about the absence of such 
information in the book was met with the PNC’s superiors’ promises 
that columns would shortly be added to the register, allowing the 
arms and ammunitions to be registered alongside the names. 
The main armourer at the Air Force auxiliary post in Gbadolite received specialized training in Kinshasa. She maintains the small stockpile of 
weapons and transmits the inventory to her superiors in Kinshasa on a regular basis
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35 \ The DRC has received several marking machines in the course of 
various international cooperation arrangements (including RECSA), 
but at the time of this study, the actual markings endeavour was 
restricted to SALW collected from civilians in one province.
Marking efforts and the prospect of digitalized 
record-keeping
The majority of arms that the team encountered 
at the visited sites, as well as most arms held by 
personnel on duty were marked in some way or 
another, making it possible (if not always easy) for 
the team to often identify at the least the type and 
manufacturing country of the arm. Markings from 
manufacturing were indeed the only way to identify 
the arms, as the DRC is yet to begin the marking of 
government-held stockpiles in Equateur Province 
and in many other parts of the country. None of the 
respondents felt they were in a position to predict 
when the country’s arms markings endeavour, that 
they assumed is underway in and around Kinshasa 
and possibly Bunia, is likely to reach Equateur and 
Nord-Oubangui Provinces.35
According to the CNC-ALPC and various specialized 
external observers active in capacity-building in this 
field, there is no centralized register that contains 
reference to all arms on the DRC’s territory. Some 
forces at best keep a record that refers to the manu-
facturer’s markings on the arms kept at particular 
sites. No evidence of a digitalization of such partial 
records was found, and there seems to be no inten-
tion to digitalize existing records in the near future.
Weapons marking pilot project, Kinshasa 
Immediately after the end of this assessment, the 
issue of PSSM had moved into the higher political 
strata where it was being addressed at the Presi-
dential level. The assessment team has been made 
aware that a pilot project on marking weapons 
used by regular forces is underway from 1 January 
to 31 March 2016 with financial support from the 
Embassy of the United Kingdom. The pilot project 
focuses on Kinshasa Province and intends to mark 
weapons from almost all branches of the security 
and defence forces including FARDC, PNC and the 
National Intelligence Agency (ANR). The pilot project 
aims to establish lessons learned and best practices 
that feed into a framework that can be used by the 
government of the DRC to develop a multi-year 
weapons-marking strategy and extend weapons 
marking across the whole country. 
This appears to be a very positive development that 
has resulted in improved cooperation between the 
two main actors in PSSM in the DRC—the CNC-ALPC 
and FARDC. The Commission is clearly the lead on 
this very useful project that, if conducted success-
fully, will complement previous work done by the 
FARDC and the PSSM Working Group and is a clear 
step towards strengthening a culture of responsible, 
safer PSSM and arms control practice in the DRC.
Markings on the fire selector of a Chinese-manufactured AK47 Type 56 variant (l.) and Arabic markings on the receiver of an Egyptian- 
manufactured AK47 pattern rifle (r.). An effective SALW marking, registration and record-keeping goes a long way in securing stockpiles and 
preventing diversion, laying the ground work for a broader tracing or tracking programme.
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Safety
Basic safety practices, regulations and protocols
Many of the visited sites were in gross violation of 
regulations and protocols intended to ensure the 
safe storage of arms and ammunition. Rockets and 
mortars, found to be old and presumed unstable and 
thus obsolete, were routinely found stored in the 
same space as functional smaller calibre ammu-
and the difficult access to the site, the capacity to 
respond adequately and efficiently in the event of an 
emergency is extremely limited.
In Mbandaka, weapons and munitions storage sites 
were dependent on alternative sources of electricity 
as was the rest of the city. Armouries visited in 
Nord-Oubangui Province were often solely equipped 
Safety indications, such as fire hazard markers, were rarely present in armouries or munitions depots (l.). Pile of obsolete weapons (r.).
with electricity provided by an on-site generator. In 
some armouries, the team could only examine their 
contents with the help of a torch.
The absence of basic facilities, such as a regular elec-
tricity supply that are taken for granted in armouries 
in developed countries once again illustrates the 
need for tailored responses to realities on the ground.
Culture of inspections
There is evidence that the relevant department of 
the FARDC carries out inspections in Bokala camp. 
This evidence, and indeed the existence of a brief 
inspection report, however does not seem to trigger 
action to help ensure that a highly unsafe situation 
is promptly remediated, as the case study below 
(p. 44 ff.) indicates.
nition and SALW. In some locations, boxes were 
stacked in high piles and not placed on pallets to 
allow for even a minimum amount of ventilation. 
The situation was found quite alarming in the 
Bokala camp facilities, which contained a large 
amount of explosive material—as is recorded in the 
extended case study (see p. 44 ff. in this Knowledge 
Note). The road to the camp is in an extremely poor 
condition, rendering transport of ammunitions 
extremely dangerous, and making it almost impos-
sible for ambulances or fire trucks to reach the site 
of the camp in case of an accident.
Bokala camp, as other visited facilities, further lacks 
basic, no-cost measures such as written safety advice 
to minimize the risk of fire, emergency contact 
numbers, sand buckets to extinguish fires and notes 
identifying protocol in case of fire or other accidents. 
Given the limited emergency response facilities 
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Securing stocks
Security measures were found deficient in practically 
all sites visited. Behind a door, (at best) closed with 
a single unsophisticated lock, arms and compatible 
ammunition were often stored side by side, and in 
some cases magazines were even loaded into the 
weapons. The team did not encounter any low-cost 
measures such as a purpose built weapons rack or a 
basic lock and chain system for safeguarding arms 
individually. In only one small armoury that was 
allotted to the état major of the air force stationed 
at Mbandaka airport, windows and ceilings to the 
storage facility were relatively well secured. In 
many other sites, large holes in the ceiling and open 
windows would make the stockpiles vulnerable to 
theft.
Theft from service armouries
Reports on actual theft from service armouries 
were however rare, and verbal accounts of incidents 
proved contested. At Bokala camp near Mbandaka, 
rumours abounded that arms were routinely taken 
out of the main armoury located in the main ammu-
nitions storage building, containing the rifles used 
A member of the FARDC locks the door to an armoury  
using one of two locks.
An improvised weapons rack used by the PNC in Mandaka, Province 
Equateur. A low-cost chain and lock system would help secure these 
weapons at minimum cost.
by the guards to protect the camp. These were alleg-
edly used during the night for criminal purposes and 
returned in the morning before anyone could notice 
they were missing. Even if the sub-optimal quality 
of PSSM practices at the camp would put little in the 
way of those wishing to take a gun for the night, 
the rumour remains unsubstantiated. Replies to the 
question whether rifles and/or ammunitions had 
ever gone missing from that particular armoury at 
Bokala camp varied from “yes, often”, “sometimes”, 
“in a few exceptional cases” and “never” – depending 
on the interlocutor and the setting in which that 
question was asked.36 To pursue these allegations is 
beyond the scope of this study.
36 \ The latter two replies were heard at the validation briefing with 
camp personnel on 23 September 2015. The former two replies were 
given in interviews with individual interlocutors, both military and 
civilians living near the camp.
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The lack of clarity and evidence of theft from 
this and other armouries in the region is further 
complicated by the lack of reliable stock reports and 
recording of withdrawals and returns of arms and 
ammunitions, as mentioned in the subsection on 
accountability. In the absence of reliable documen-
tation of arms and ammunitions that went missing 
from service armouries, such theft can only be docu-
mented by reports on violent acts committed with 
arms presumed stolen from service armouries.37
Cross-border trade
While the team stayed in the Gbadolite area, it 
actively looked into evidence of the trade of SALW 
and ammunition from one side of the border to the 
other or vice versa. Although rumours about such 
traffic abounded, little such evidence was found 
in the DRC.38 Traffic from the DRC to its northern 
neighbour has been more extensively docu-
mented in the Central African Republic.39 An inde-
A wide range of commodities are transported and traded across  
the narrow Oubangui River that separates DRC (r.) from CAR (l.).  
A pirogue is about to land on the Congolese bank of the Oubangui River, 
near the market at Mobayi Mbongo. 
37 \ Such reports turned out to be very limited, confined to one news 
report about the theft of at least four arms from a FARDC armoury in 
Gbadolite in mid-2014. As the presumed culprit could not be arrested 
and remains in hiding (more than a year after the theft), no further 
information was forthcoming about the motives of the theft and its 
possible connection with the “market for arms” across the border, 
in war-torn Central African Republic. The team’s repeated requests 
for a paper-trail documenting that prosecution, or even newspaper 
articles, remained unanswered.
38 \ The evidence was limited to one report on an industrially produced 
AK-type arm found in the possession of a presumed Seleka-affiliated 
fighter from the Central African Republic, arrested on the DRC side 
of the border (FARDC, Gbadolite, October 2015).
39 \ According to an independent expert source consulted in September 
2015 on cross-border trafficking between the DRC and CAR.
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pendent expert source, consulted on this matter in 
September 2015, reported that the presence of arms 
from the DRC has indeed been documented since 
July 2014. These arms were found in heterogeneous 
(mixed) batches, typically containing an assortment 
of assault rifles of the FAL, Galil and SAR-808 types; 
as well as Uzi machine guns. The sources indicated 
the arms were linked to Congolese stockpiles on the 
basis of markings found on some of the arms identi-
fying the “Etat Congolais” or in some cases “Zaïrois” 
as their owner. In other cases, the producers of arms 
bearing specific serial numbers could confirm these 
arms were at one time, and fully legally, transferred 
to the DRC (or Zaïre, as it was called in earlier times). 
But even if these arms can be linked to the DRC 
on the basis of their considerable age, the ‘typical’ 
heterogeneity of the batches in which these were 
found, and the fact that the security detail of Presi-
dent Ange-Féix Patassé at one time contained armed 
troops from the DRC linked to Bemba, there is no 
basis on which to determine how, nor even when, 
these arms were transferred from the DRC to the 
frontier with the Central African Republic that they 
must at one time have crossed. The expert continued 
that they had no grounds to say the presence of these 
arms in the Central African Republic is the product 
of casual ant-trading or whether they were brought 
in by way of a well-organized scheme. What they do 
know for sure is that a certain number of the arms 
present in the Central African Republic since July 
2014 are compatible with the arms recorded at earlier 
times in the DRC (same model, manufacturers 
markings and similar serial numbers). Regard-
less whether they were first present in the Central 
African Republic and later in the DRC or whether 
this went the other way around, we do recognize 
this as evidence of trans-frontier trafficking, though 
not necessarily of recent trafficking. Several sources 
in the Central African Republic consulted in the past 
months (summer 2015) within the armed forces, the 
gendarmerie, the police, customs, MINUSCA and 
diplomatic missions all have reason to believe that 
arms continue to be trafficked across the Oubangui 
River. 
One source in particular provided information that 
suggested the UPC (Peuhl branch of the former 
Séleka coalition) was in the process of re-arming 
from sources on the other [DRC] side of the Oubangui 
River.
More evidence seems to suggest that artisanally 
produced hunting rifles are being traded within and/
or trafficked out of the DRC. Studies conducted by 
the CNC-ALPC in 2014 and by other organizations40 
on the production and commercialization of hunting 
rifles produced by local blacksmiths covering other 
areas of the DRC indicated a significant amount in 
and near Yakoma, in Nord-Oubangui Province. In 
that location, even Kalashnikov-style machine guns 
were reported to be produced.41 Anecdotal evidence 
claims that producers of these artisanal weapons 
had overcome the difficulty of crafting receiver 
mechanisms that were capable of loading and firing 
ammunition on a self-loading, repeating basis. 
While there might be some weight to rumours that 
artisanal producers were taking advantage of the 
large amount of available spare parts from assault 
rifles to construct such weapons, the evaluation 
team has not seen such a weapon and therefore 
cannot provide more information on this issue. 
40 \ A GRIP study specifically dealing with artisanal weapons also 
provides useful background on this issue (Berghezan, 2015).
41 \ As the evaluation team did not encounter such weapons, it remains 
difficult to determine whether such arms are built from scratch or 
assembled from recycled pieces. This observation is also not meant 
to qualify what is mainly anecdotal evidence about the existence of 
these weapons. A CNC-ALPC study on artisanal weapons which was 
being written at the time of writing should provide more material 
although the team was unable to obtain a draft at the time of publi-
cation of this Knowledge Note.
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A study conducted by the CNC-ALPC at the end of 
2014 found that hunting rifles were being offered 
for sale at prices as low as US $30 in the immediate 
proximity of their presumed site of production. In 
Gbadolite, still relatively close to Yakoma, these same 
rifles would sell for US $100. In Mbandaka, local 
blacksmiths offered their wares to members of the 
team for US $300 per piece. Ammunition (calibre 00) 
was in all instances reported to sell at 1000 Congo-
lese francs per round—roughly one US dollar. 
In both places, clients for such guns were reported 
to also come from “across the river”, meaning 
the Republic of the Congo near Mbandaka and 
the Central African Republic in Nord-Oubangui 
 Province. Here, it seems that such exchanges could 
be made at the weekly market at Mobayi-Mbongo. 
Artisanally manufactured shotgun chambered for 00 cartridges offered for sale to the team for the equivalent of US $300.  
The shotgun was fitted with a mechanical safety device to block the trigger mechanism (right).
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Obsolete and unusable weapons and ammunition
In an unstable state, surplus, obsolete and incompat-
ible arms and munitions are often found in abun-
dance side by side, and more often than not there 
are no clear mechanisms for their destruction or 
safe disposal. This was also the case when the team 
visited various sites in the DRC. While the personnel 
in charge and/or their hierarchical superior were 
aware of the security risks caused by these stock-
piles, none of them was seen taking concrete steps to 
dispose of them. Limited knowledge of proper proce-
dures and channels to formally request the removal 
and destruction of the materials exists.
Similarly, the evaluation team noted that large piles 
of obsolete and unusable weapons were mixed in 
with serviceable weapons, with no guarantee that 
their presence was recorded accurately in the regis-
ters of the armourers. The presence of these weapons 
increases the risk of diversion, as still functional 
parts and material can be used illegitimately in 
artisanal weapons production. Therefore, obsolete, 
unusable or “hors service” weapons should also be 
destroyed or disposed of systematically at the earliest 
possible opportunity. 
Identifying and establishing mechanisms for the 
destruction or safe disposal of surplus and obsolete 
arms and ammunition should indeed be a clear 
priority for the Congolese authorities. Communica-
tion channels ought to be made clear to personnel 
responsible for the maintenance of these stockpiles 
and their superiors, even if this means that they 
are provided with a template where necessary. This 
should indeed be a clear priority for the Congolese 
authorities. Failure to do so increases the risk of an 
unintentional explosion and puts the lives of mili-
tary personnel and surrounding civilian communi-
ties in great danger. 
Family members of the soldiers working in the nearby munitions  
storage sites in Bokala prepare manioc leaves to cook dinner.  
Women are aware of the danger of an unintentional explosion but  
more immediate concerns about primary health care and access  
to clean water are prioritized. 
Miscellaneous parts of AR-15, Galil and Kalashnikov pattern rifles  
are stored in a rice bag at a police outpost in Mbandaka.
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PSSM in practice
This section focuses on how PSSM works in practice through three case studies 
including a large weapons and munitions storage site in Bokala camp in 
Mbandaka, a Congolese Naval Forces armoury operating next to a health clinic in 
Mbandaka and a Congolese police position on the frontier with the Central African 
Republic in Nord-Oubangui Province. The first case study provides a comprehen-
sive insight into the methodology used by the team, locating the technical find-
ings in a socio-economic context and providing an analysis of observed practices. 
Specific practices observed in the latter two case studies are illustrated through 
a visual narrative to provide an insight into the reality of the complex task of the 
management of weapons and ammunition. Infrastructural and practice-based 
findings are identified and recommendations are made.
Several unusable Kalashnikov rifles along with various parts from M-16A1 and Galil rifles stored together.
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An aerial overview of the Bokala munitions depot \ © Google.  
Map data: DigitalGlobe
Case study on Bokala camp, Mbandaka
in use since 1957. That storage was beyond rehabil-
itation after the fire, and as the camp was by then 
surrounded by a densely populated urban area, no 
plans were being made to build a new storage facility 
on the same site. Explosive materials that had 
remained relatively unscathed in the fire and were 
deemed stable were removed from the debris of the 
site, and as a temporary measure they were trans-
ferred to Bokala, a military camp further removed 
from the urban centre. 
Introduction
Bokala military camp42 is situated about four kilo-
metres south of Mbandaka and can only be reached 
via a dirt road. The grounds of the camp used to be 
a plantation, until 1977 when its owner went bank-
rupt and the Congolese state seized the grounds. A 
group of ten brick-and-mortar blocks that had been 
constructed to house plantation workers were then 
occupied by soldiers and their families. A handful 
of larger buildings were converted into offices and a 
guard post. An open shed protects about ten pieces of 
heavy artillery.
Since 2007, two of the buildings in the camp’s 
housing zone have been used to store various types 
of explosive material. These are shown on the 
picture as Magasin 1 and Magasin 2. The presence of 
these materials, the team was told, is a consequence 
of a fire that destroyed Camp Ngashi in 2007—a 
military camp in the centre of Mbandaka where a 
proper purpose-built munitions storage had been 
42 \ The case study is based on extensive field trip visits to Bokala camp 
on Tuesday 22 and Wednesday 23 September 2015. The last visit was 
concluded with a validation meeting with the base’s highest officers 
responsible for, inter alia, logistics and the maintenance of the 
improvised storage. Comments made at that validation session were 
taken up in this narrative account.
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The conversion of two of Bokala’s housing blocks to 
improvised munitions storage, in turn, is explained 
by the lack of facilities where dangerous material 
such as larger calibre munitions, rockets and other 
explosives materials can be stored safely. Promises 
were made to promptly construct a proper secure 
storage facility for longer-term storage of material 
that had survived the fire at Camp Ngashi and serve 
as a munitions depot for the armed forces in the 
wider area, including the navy and the national 
police.
The dangerous situation at Bokala camp was pointed 
out in internal (army) inspections and external 
evaluations alike—including an assessment by MAG 
in 2011 that was intended to put donor organizations 
and FARDC in the position to identify interven-
tions.43 Short-term interventions were proposed to 
make the situation in the storage less dangerous, 
and costs were calculated for the construction of 
a secure storage facility elsewhere on the camp-
grounds. That MAG assessment, in turn, is referred 
to in an internal FARDC inspection of later date that 
proposes an intermediate solution (four containers 
to be placed near the shooting range, about one 
kilometre further from where the munitions are 
currently stored), while advocating for the construc-
tion of a purpose-built secure storage facility as a 
longer-term solution. 
Fact-finding at Bokala camp,  
September to October 2015: Methodology
The head of the état-major général des armées 
authorized the team to visit Bokala camp in 
the presence of FARDC logistics persons. These 
visits took place on 22 and 23 September, and on 
5 October 2015,44 accompanied by personnel from 
CNC-ALPC Kinshasa headquarters, as well as from 
the Mbandaka antenna. The MAG technical field 
manager along with BICC’s technical advisor and 
the evaluation team were authorized to enter the 
munitions depot, to measure, take pictures of the 
location and to identify and count the different 
types of munitions stored there. They also conducted 
about twenty interviews with various respondents 
working and/or living at Bokala camp, which helped 
to draw up the socio-economic profile of the camp 
and its surroundings, probe the awareness of the 
risks of life and work in the proximity of munitions 
and larger calibre explosives, and evaluate practices 
in place to contain such risks.
43 \ “cette étude devrait permettre aux organismes donateurs et aux FARDC 
d’identifier des interventions”, quoted from Mine Action Group, 2011.
44 \ These visits also allowed the team to evaluate two different 
armouries located at Bokala camp. The findings of that evaluation 
are incorporated in the general appraisal of PSSM practices in the 
Equateur and Nord-Ubangui Provinces.
A member of the assessment team evaluates a munitions storage site 
containing 120mm high explosive artillery shells at Bokala while  
an FARDC logistician looks on. The fuses for the shells are stored 
 separately in line with international PSSM standards.
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One building, indicated as Magasin 2 on the Google 
Earth map, houses both people and munitions. It is 
140 meters removed from the main munition storage 
in the block labelled on the map as Magasin 1, which 
is surrounded by barbed wire. In addition to muni-
tions and explosives, this building contains a small 
armoury where about 25 assault rifles are stored on 
an improvised rack. The arms are not individually 
secured, and the rack is placed near an open window. 
A first validation meeting about the initial findings 
was held at the camp’s état-major office at the end 
of the 23 September visit, giving the base’s highest 
officers responsible for logistics and the mainte-
nance of the improvised storage the opportunity to 
provide feedback. The analysis of the findings was 
further validated in a meeting on provincial level 
held at the Mbandaka CNC-ALPC antenna building 
on 8 October, as well as in national validation 
meetings held in Kinshasa on 12 and 13 October, for 
the CNC-ALPC and for representatives of the inter-
national community, respectively. Comments made 
during each of these validation meetings fed into the 
following account of what was found to be the case 
at and around Bokala camp.
Findings
Infrastructure and perimeter: Bokala camp fails to 
qualify as a munitions depot—the term that trans-
lates from “poudrière”; by which the locals describe 
the facility. The thin-walled brick-and-mortar build-
ings have simple aluminium plate roofs. The camp 
has no secure outer perimeter. It can be reached 
over a bad dirt road that leads to a guard house, 
where armed soldiers routinely stop and question 
approaching vehicles while pedestrians and (motor)
bikers using this road to get to huts that surround 
the camp and to reach Bolenge, a nearby village, are 
usually allowed to pass. It is likely that the terrible 
condition of the road leading to the storage sites 
in Bokala has contributed to making the muni-
tions transferred from Ngashi to Bokala even more 
unstable. 
The stock of munitions and explosive materials 
are in fact divided over two of ten building blocks 
that make up the camp’s main housing area. Each 
of these blocks is 49 x 10 metres. A large number of 
children who live there play around the buildings, 
up to the doorsteps of the block where munitions and 
other dangerous goods are stored.
A member of the assessment team discussing storage practices  
with FARDC armourers. Despite being neatly labelled and  
well maintained, the 25 AK pattern rifles are stored next to an  
open window. \ Photo by Captain Budri Adobe FARDC / BICC
The main munitions storage building contains 
six compartments. Three of these compartments 
are 7.80m long, 6.55m wide and 3m high; the other 
three compartments are equally long and high, 
but are slightly wider at 7.43m. The outer walls of 
the building, as well as the walls separating the 
compartments, are about 200mm thick. Water seeps 
in through cracks in the walls. The flooring is of 
reinforced concrete. Aluminium plates that serve 
as the roof have not been fitted with anti-intrusion 
grids. Ventilation is extremely poor in each of the 
compartments, and temperatures reportedly reach 
up to 40 °C. Each of the compartments is closed 
by a simple wooden door (not-reinforced) that is 
secured with a small lock. The keys to the locks on 
these doors are kept by the persons in charge of this 
facility, that is members of the 13th région militaire 
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and the naval force, even when off duty and outside 
of the secure facility. This contradicts the estab-
lished best practice of storing the key in a lockable 
container under guard away from the arms or 
munition storage area. This avoids a possible situa-
tion where access to the key—and therefore access 
to the munitions and weapons in an emergency by 
legitimate soldiers—is impossible as the bearer of 
the key is away. Should the bearer of the key have an 
accident or be robbed when off-duty, there would be 
an increased risk of weapons being stolen or diverted 
from the camp. 
From a safety perspective, two issues are worth 
noting: For one, none of the installations are 
equipped with a lightning rod. This is particularly 
problematic as Equateur Province is notorious for 
fierce thunderstorms, a major source of fire inci-
dents. There is not a single fire extinguisher nor 
sand bucket available, even though these items 
are not costly. Security warnings or signs listing 
emergency phone numbers to call in case of an 
accident are also absent. Given the limited response 
capacity of the emergency services in Bokala, this 
is a particular issue of concern as response time 
would increase even further. There is one fire engine 
normally parked at Mbandaka airport—at least a 
forty minute drive away from the perimeter of the 
base—and the terrible conditions of the road would 
make access for the bulky truck even more difficult.
A second high risk is the rather large number of 
people who have access to the site. In one recorded 
instance, they actually lived in a building where 
munitions were stored. They also routinely pass by 
the main storage building that contains explosives 
and other dangerous material. Their ungoverned use 
of cell phones and radios creates a situation where 
the generated electromagnetic field could potentially 
trigger an explosion. The same holds true for unreg-
ulated smoking.
Storage conditions and contents: In two of the 
compartments of the storage building, different cali-
bres of munitions were found to be sorted and boxed. 
Boxes were positioned on wooden supports or pallets 
to allow for some ventilation between the boxes. 
These precautions in these particular compartments 
may well be the outcome of recommendations by 
MAG (or perhaps actions) during its 2011 visit of the 
camp. Unfortunately, the situation already seems to 
be deteriorating. 
Storage conditions in the other compartments are 
far more problematic. There is no evidence that 
actions were taken according to the recommen-
dations given by MAG (and possibly others). Small 
and larger calibre munitions are not organized by 
year of production, batch number or lot number 
but are mixed: Some in bulk, others in boxes that 
are stacked high on top of one another and others 
still in rice sacks. The accumulated weight of the 
contents, the humidity and extreme temperature 
conditions in the storage sites as well as the presence 
of termites or rodents that eat away at the wooden 
boxes or pallets create far from ideal storage condi-
tions. The evaluation team recorded instances where 
the wooden boxes were close to splitting open at 
the seams, the bottom edges having been chewed 
through, and in one instance boxes filled with 23mm 
rockets had slid off the stack and the only reason 
they had not collapsed on the floor was because 
they happened to fall against a wall that tempo-
rarily held up this precarious structure. Sub-optimal 
storage conditions combined with heat, humidity 
and unclean facilities provide ideal conditions for 
insects such as termites to thrive resulting in safety 
hazards. 
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Finally, the observation team also noted the 
presence of white powder on the floor of certain 
armouries, which was verified to be highly inflam-
mable explosive resin leaking from the stored muni-
tions. High exposure to heat and humidity combined 
with poorly ventilated facilities can decrease the 
shelf life of ammunition. In some cases, this accel-
erated erosion can also result in chemical leakages 
such as in the case of explosive powder and resin 
documented on the floor of a storage site in Bokala 
munitions facility.
Smaller calibre munitions, presumed post-2007 
acquisitions, were found alongside munitions 
that contain explosives, including RPG-7 rockets, 
122mm and 82mm mortars as well as assorted fuses 
and primers. These were not stored as they should 
have been, that is protected against dust, in closed 
boxes marked by a classification code. Some of the 
larger calibre devices appeared to be in bad shape, 
and would have needed to be safely disposed of or 
destroyed. It is likely that they became even more 
unstable due to the temperature shock these mate-
rials had suffered in the 2007 fire at Ngashi camp, 
and the fact that these were transported from there 
in less than ideal conditions 
The compartments were calculated to contain 50 
tons of explosive material, of which five tons were 
deemed active high explosive material. But not all 
munitions found in the storage were those that 
had survived the fire at Ngashi camp in 2007. The 
presence of smaller calibre munitions produced 
after 2007 indicates that they must have arrived 
from places other than the Ngashi debris. This also 
suggests that the obvious inadequacy and makeshift 
nature of the Bokala storage camp has not prevented 
those responsible for deciding where to ship and 
store which type of munitions from using it as a 
replacement of the munitions depot that used to be 
at Ngashi camp. Bokala has become the de facto loca-
tion where all branches of the armed forces and the 
PNC bring the bulk of their munitions for storage.45 
Highly flammable explosive resin on the floor of a storage site in Bokala munitions facility (l.). Wooden ammunition boxes chewed and  
weakened by termites (r.).
45 \ Small volumes of small calibre munitions for ‘immediate use’ tend 
to be kept in their respective armouries, elsewhere in town, as is 
explained in this study.
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A recent incident proving this point was reported 
when an explosive device self-propelled through the 
wall of the storage, and began a flight towards the 
city, creating havoc underway. The device failed to 
explode before it came to a halt after approximately 
four kilometres of flight. No plausible explanation 
was given as to how this could have happened, other 
than by ‘the grace of God’. 
PSSM practices: As indicated in the section above, 
the conditions in which the munitions and explo-
sives devices are kept are far below adequate, and 
increase the risk of theft, but also of fire and explo-
sions. The absence of markings on munitions boxes 
and registers in most storage sites as well as the 
presence of all sorts of objects and materials, such 
as wooden sticks, cardboard and plastic sheets that 
should not be there as they increase the risk of fire 
adds to the general state of disorder. Adding further 
to the fire hazard was the fact that the buildings 
were unclean, with garbage and piles of paper in the 
vicinity of and in the storage sites themselves. Cell 
phone use in the vicinity of the armouries was also 
unregulated. 
Personnel in charge of the storage(s) are not easily 
identified by photo identification cards, and appear 
unsure of correct procedures, which is understand-
able as many of them have ‘inherited’ this situation 
rather than having created it. Some of them are said 
to have had “some sort of training”, but it is apparent 
that it was inadequate. Their superiors seem better 
informed as to how things should be done (one 
keeps a manual on storage practices locked away 
in his office drawer) but there does not seem to be 
any pressure on them to provide guidance towards 
building a culture of a more responsible manage-
ment of the stockpiles. But there are examples that 
this may change: Some officers in charge of Bokala 
camp logistics reported having been admonished for 
negligence in the course of a July 2015 internal army 
inspection. 
It will however take more than good intentions and 
reprimanding a few officers to change practices in 
reality. For example, despite a noted willingness 
to have obsolete large calibre munitions removed 
safely because the recognized the obvious danger 
they present, precious little action has reportedly 
been taken. Neither armourers nor their superiors 
appear to know the correct procedures and channels 
through which to approach those who can authorise 
the safe and secure removal or disposal by the 
Centre Congolais de la Lutte Antimines (CCLAM), for 
instance.  
Socio-economic context of Bokala camp: As shown 
above, Bokala camp is more than a military estab-
lishment. The buildings house far more than just 
soldiers. Most live there with their families. At least 
200 such families are currently believed to live at the 
base. According to observations on site and conserv-
ative estimates, the average Congolese household 
consists of at least five members, which means that 
well over 1,000 people live at Bokala camp proper 
with less than one-quarter of them enrolled as actual 
soldiers. Apart from living quarters that contain 
all these people, the camp grounds also house the 
offices of the état-major, various small businesses 
that sell produce grown at the camp grounds or 
products brought in from Mbandaka, a school that 
educates about 150 children, as well as a health care 
centre. 
5.56mm small arms ammunition manufactured after 2007
documented in Bokala.
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This health care centre was rehabilitated in the 
recent past with EU funding. A team of six (mili-
tary) nurses look after what they themselves esti-
mate to be around 4,000 patients,46 from the base 
and from nearby villages. Most of their workload 
consists of midwifery, assisting at births as well 
as providing health care and first aid to patients 
suffering from malaria and diarrhoea. They refer 
those needing more specialized services to the new 
military hospital at Ngashi camp or the hospital at 
Mbandaka. The Bokala health centre thus processes 
many more than the 250 soldiers who live and/or 
work at the camp47 and include at least another 1,000 
people categorized as “their families”. In sum, only 
one-quarter of the patients appear to have a link to 
the military and the base.48 
The school for children aged six to twelve years 
was established on request of the military fami-
lies living at Bokala camp, and its six improvised 
classrooms are in (or next to) a building shared with 
the armed guards at the entrance to the camp. The 
management of the school also seeks to educate 
other children living nearby.49 Even if the Congolese 
state payed the basic salary of the teachers and the 
director, a larger number of (paying) pupils would 
generate more funds and would allow the school 
to break even more comfortably than is the case 
at present. The school, as the health centre located 
nearby, has recently found an increasing population 
to recruit from: Ever more people are building huts 
in the grounds around the camp and along the road 
connecting the camp to Mbandaka town. In a way, 
a new village is encroaching on the area around the 
camp.
Those who live at Bokala camp proper are one 
quarter soldiers and three quarters civilians. Other 
residents of the housing blocks are active soldiers’ 
wives and their children, as well as widows and 
orphans of soldiers who once lived there (their 
history may go back all the way to 1977). A sizeable 
proportion of the residents are youngsters who live 
at the camp with their ‘military’ parents. Camp rules 
nevertheless set 18 years as the maximum age, after 
which all non-military children should be ‘evicted' 
from any military camp. Contradictory accounts are 
heard as to whether and to what extent that rule is 
respected. In one account, the rule is complied with, 
but children or younger brothers of active soldiers 
are allowed to spend holidays at the camp, and such 
holidays appear to be prolonged as is not unexpected. 
The presence or circulation in and around the camp 
of numerous civilian-looking young and older males 
was also explained as passers-by on the route to 
the village Bolenge. That route has no guards at the 
other end of the camp—such scrutiny is deemed 
unnecessary as the road is in such a bad state that 
it is impossible to drive a car there. The MAG tech-
nical field manager observed that positioning guards 
along the perimeter of the camp rather than clus-
tering guards only around the depots would create a 
more secure environment. 
46 \ Interviews conducted at the hospital, Mbandaka, 23 September 2015.
47 \ Another 100 to 150 soldiers work at the camp but live in Mbandaka 
town.
48 \ Many patients seek medical care in this health centre even though 
they are not connected to the military because it is close to where 
they live and they expect to receive the service for free. In principle 
only patients from the military get the service free of charge, but 
many others hope to somehow slip into that category. The hospital 
reportedly charges 3,000 francs (around US $35) to ‘outsiders for the 
delivery of a child.
49 \ Interview with the director and several of the teachers employed by 
the school, 23 September 2015.
Children sitting against the wall of an adapted storage area containing 
artillery shells and rockets, close to their residential quarters.
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Analysis
Given the conditions in which munitions and other 
explosive materials are currently stored at  Bokala 
camp, the risk of an unplanned explosion is deemed 
high. The UN SaferGuard software can project what 
may happen at the camp: 
In a scenario where the two buildings containing 
munitions and explosives blow up simultaneously, 
all of the Bokala population risk being lethally, or 
at the least very seriously, affected (lung damage, 
eardrum rupture, etc). Fragments of explosives and 
debris would be projected far beyond the current 
camp, into the housing area that fairly recently 
sprung up around the camp ground, and even into 
the area of Mbandaka closest to the camp. An esti-
mated ten thousand people, military and civilian, 
would be affected, as would the infrastructure at 
and around the camp, including the school, health 
centre, structures harbouring heavy artillery, the 
modest SALW stockpile and their munitions, as 
well as the larger calibre munitions that would very 
likely trigger the explosion.
Relief to the affected population would also be very 
hard to administer, as the road to the camp is in 
such bad condition that it is virtually inaccessible by 
ambulances and the fire truck that is positioned at 
the airport. The limited medical care available in the 
area combined with the absence of any fire protec-
tion services including simple means such as fire 
extinguishers or sand buckets makes the situation 
even more precarious.
The danger in Bokala is clear to most—though not 
all—residents of the camp.50 The wider Mbandaka 
area has reportedly already been the scene of 
three unplanned explosions in the recent past, 
and the DRC has seen several more such incidents 
Soldiers and civilians stand together outside an  
ammunitions storage facility in Bokala
Women and their children gather water from the pump close to  
a munitions storage site in Bokala50 \ A number of ‘camp wife’ respondents, interviewed with Linga-
la-French translation assistance by a CNC-ALPC employee, claimed 
they had no idea that their children lived in such danger.
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throughout the past decades.51 Many other cities 
in the DRC and neighbouring countries have also 
recently experienced major incidents of a magni-
tude that risks occurring at Bokala camp. One would 
assume that the (military) authorities could draw 
from lessons learned from such similar incidents 
and act accordingly. 
The danger of the situation has effectively been 
pointed out in internal (army) inspections and 
external evaluations alike—including an assessment 
by MAG in 2011 referred to in an internal FARDC 
inspection of July 2015 that calls for urgent meas-
ures.
Officers in charge of Bokala camp logistics admitted 
being admonished for their negligence in the 
course of the internal army inspection in 2015 
and explained their reasons why they did not take 
action:
 \  There were insufficient means put at their 
disposal (apparently, including by interna-
tional donors and partners, no matter whether 
the issues to deal with touch at the heart of the 
state monopoly on violence);
 \  There were no orders or authorization from 
higher up in the hierarchy;
 \  International organizations, specifically MAG, 
have failed to live up to “promises” that were 
understood to have been made when MAG 
studied Bokala munitions depot and delivered 
its report in 2011. One interlocutor even called 
the making of the study “a distraction” that 
only resulted in prolonged inaction.
These arguments are not unique to the Bokala situ-
ation. The fact that MAG or another “foreign entity” 
conducted a technical survey with the intent to give 
advice on how to design and construct a safer storage 
facility raised inflated expectations that were based 
on a misreading of who is indeed responsible for 
what action. Once these expectations were not met, 
the international aid community was blamed for 
having “failed” them. These expectations may be 
traced back to specific historical experiences that 
may have contributed to a certain dependency on 
international assistance and aid. 
This is a reminder of why it is important to clarify 
roles and responsibilities and to manage expecta-
tions effectively on projects. MAG does not have the 
means nor can it be expected to construct armouries 
that were never promised. Similarly, the Congolese 
have not met expectations due to internal logistical 
or procedural issues. It is therefore crucial to identify 
the correct channels of communication to remedy 
these issues and to ensure greater clarity on who is 
responsible for what actions in future undertakings. 
Finally, it is also worth noting that the Congolese 
government is ultimately responsible for the safety 
and security of its own citizens—a responsibility 
that cannot be transferred to any international 
humanitarian body. 
The current state of Bokala military camp takes up 
a prominent position in a sequence of hazardous 
situations: From a fire caused by the unsafe storage 
of explosives in Ngashi camp, the storage of those 
materials that survived that incident in Bokala 
camp, where they might at any time cause an even 
bigger catastrophe to the time (at the least eight 
years) that has elapsed since Bokala was turned into 
such a dangerous place. During that time period, 
a series of alerts and efforts to take action to some-
what secure the Bokala munitions and explosives 
stocks have failed to change the situation at Bokala 
camp for reasons that need to be investigated 
further. What is clear is that the situation would 
have improved if the recommendations provided by 
MAG in 2011 had been followed and if a greater effort 
had been made to manage the storage buildings in 
line with the recommendations made in the EUSEC/ 
FARDC aide-mémoire.
51 \ The Small Arms Survey records nine such incidents in the DRC 
section of its database covering 1979 to 2015. These incidents report-
edly resulted in 131 fatalities and 307 injured people. Several respond-
ents were aware of unplanned explosions occurring in neighbouring 
Republic of the Congo, where as recent as 2012, the very large 
explosion in Brazzaville is remembered to have taken a heavy toll on 
human life.
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Description of location
The Office of the Commissariat of Police Mobayi-
Mbongo is located about an hour’s drive north-east 
of Gbadolite on the border with the Central African 
Republic (CAR). The office is housed in a low, single-
story building with eight main rooms of different 
sizes. Several windows and aeration vents are built 
into the plaster-covered brick walls. The building 
Visual Narrative:  
Frontier PNC Position, Mobayi-Mbongo, Nord-Oubangui Province
Name of Armoury:  Police Nationale Congolaise  
Etat Majeur, Commandant (EM. Comdt)  
Commissariat  
Mobayi-Mbongo Police 
Date: 1 October 2015
Location: Mobayi-Mbongo, Nord-Oubangui Province, DRC
is positioned in a wide compound with a thatched 
outdoor guard post. The compound is about four 
hundred metres from the River Oubangui that serves 
as a narrow, liquid frontier between the DRC and 
CAR. The main PNC compound is also located about 
three hundred metres away from a large outdoor 
market where produce and commodities from the 
DRC and CAR are sold on a daily basis.
??? \ ???Main compound of the Commissariat of Police, Mobayi-Mbongo
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The PNC also maintains a smaller armoury closer 
to the market and next to one of the more popular 
access points for crossing the river between the two 
countries. 
The pathway leading from the transit point across 
the river, past the office of the état majeur cie (EM 
Cie) and the main office of the commissariat of 
police, Mobayi-Mbongo is busy with a constant 
flow of people, mainly women carrying produce 
and commodities to be purchased or to be sold at 
the main market. The office of the Congolese direc-
tor-general of migration (DGM) monitors the official 
transit point, but it is important to note that the 
river can also be traversed at several other points. 
While details of the technical assessment of 17 
other armouries assessed can be found in the MAG 
Technical Evaluation accompanying this study, this 
site was deliberately excluded. This was because a 
relatively small number of weapons were housed in 
this site. However, due to its location immediately 
Organigram of the PNC in the district of Nord-Oubangui. 
The smaller outposts of Mbongo, Businga, Bosobolo 
and Yakoma also fall under the supervision of the main 
commissariat located in Mobayi-Mobongo.
The market at Mobayi-Mbongo lies just across the Central African Republic and serves as a commercial hub. Mainly women carry produce including 
fish, fruits and vegetables and fabric while the men mostly provide bicycle taxis and operate pirogues that ferry people across the river.
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on the frontier with CAR, its proximity to the River 
Oubangui and the presence of a large market in the 
vicinity, this site has been selected as the focus of 
one of two visual narratives in this study.
Specific characteristics of buildings and infra-
structure: The walls of the main building and the 
smaller armoury located close by are made of brick, 
covered with plaster and are unpainted.
Both buildings are single-storey structures with 
several ventilation points and windows or gaps in 
the wall. These gaps are large enough for an assault 
rifle to be passed through. Both buildings have a 
corrugated tin roof with no additional protection; in 
the secondary armoury a very large gap was recorded 
above the area where weapons are stored.
Both buildings are fitted with non-reinforced doors, 
secured with single locks. Even if the doors were 
locked, it would still be possible to enter the building 
through the windows or the ceiling. 
No secure box in a secure location is used to store 
keys. Keys are instead stored on the person of the 
commanding officer. 
Context
Conversations with some community members, 
including family members of the PNC personnel 
working at the post revealed an awareness of the 
kind of material stored in the armoury. There is a 
strong conviction from those interviewed that these 
weapons are there to be used by the police forces 
for the protection of the surrounding communities. 
Conversations with some women in the market 
and others carrying produce back from the market 
confirmed they were aware of the fact that there 
was a police station located in the buildings but, 
as expected, they had little idea of the contents of 
the storage site. On the basis of limited discussions 
with both family members of the PNC and other 
passers by, there seemed to be an awareness of the 
unstable political situation across the border in CAR 
which is also not unexpected. There is a substantial 
flow of refugees from CAR into the DRC due to the 
insecurity and conflict, several of whom are infor-
mally given shelter by extended family members 
or by Congolese households. During the process of 
this assessment, fresh violence had broken out in 
Bangui which some of the people interviewed were 
also aware of. It is also worth noting that interna-
tional agencies such as UNHCR were also involved in 
evacuating staff using boats across the river and the 
Direction Générale du Migration (DGM) official inter-
viewed on site was also aware of the situation.
The unrepaired, corrugated tin roof offers little or no protection to  
the weapons or ammunition against either theft or the elements.
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In addition to a few traders, the family members of 
a few policemen were also interviewed. They were 
aware of the political unrest in CAR and expressed 
concern about their husbands’ role on a frontier posi-
tion with limited resources in the event of a security 
incident.
If the political situation deteriorated and there were 
a fresh outbreak of violence, particularly if this 
violence were to spread across the river from CAR 
into the DRC, the police admitted that with the 
few weapons in the armoury, their poor condition 
and the limited amount of compatible ammunition 
available, they would not be able to preserve security 
in the area. 
Through discussions with the PNC in Gbadolite and 
Mbandaka, the team was told that the PNC in other 
positions, conscious of their low stocks of armoury 
and the far from ideal condition of their weapons, 
was prepared to call in the FARDC for reinforce-
ments in case of an outbreak of conflict. However, 
in discussions with police officers in Mobayi-
Mbongo, they seemed less convinced that the FARDC 
would be able to come to their aid if required. PNC 
personnel also asked the team to inform Kinshasa 
Family members of policemen at the PNC outpost in Mobayi-Mbongo
??? \ ???A member of the PNC holds up a damaged M-16A1 rifle that is  
currently in active service in Mobayi-Mbongo.
of the shortage of ammunition and to request that
this situation be rectified. Based on ammunition
and weapons stockpiles observed at different PNC
armouries in Gbadolite and Mbandaka it appears
that the unavailability of compatible ammunition
might have more to do with an inefficient distribu-
tion process rather than a shortage. Several boxes
of compatible 5.56mm small arms ammuni-tion
were recorded at PNC positions in Mbandaka that
supports this theory.
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Cross-border trafficking of weapons and  
artisanal weapons
While the team was in Nord-Oubangui Province, 
they paid particular attention to any evidence that 
SALW and ammunition were being traded across the 
border. The assessment team witnessed some unsub-
stantiated claims made that large amounts of arms 
and ammunition were being transported across this 
river between the countries. At a FARDC outpost in 
Gbadolite, the team were shown photographs of one 
supposed Seleka rebel who had been apprehended 
while crossing the river holding a Kalashnikov 
variant assault rifle.
At the validation meeting held at UNHCR in Gbad-
olite, several people, including local Congolese staff 
from various international agencies including those 
responsible for security management claimed that 
trade in small arms was common across the border 
between CAR and the DRC.
Similarly additional claims that artisanal weapons 
were being manufactured across the river in CAR, 
and that craftsmen had even mastered the tech-
nology of manufacturing repeating, as opposed to 
single-action, rifles were heard. Claims were also 
made that ammunition for artisanal weapons—00 or 
01 cartridges filled with ball bearings—were avail-
able in the Mobayi-Mbongo market and that they 
were being sold by the kilo. 
The assessment team recorded two artisanal rifles 
(type Baikal52) kept out of sight behind a plank in 
the smaller PNC armoury in Mobayi-Mbongo. Upon 
questioning, the officer in charge revealed that these 
had apparently been seized from local hunters. Seven 
assorted rifles including Kalashnikov variants, a 
US American manufactured M-16A1 and an Israeli 
manufactured Galil rifle were also stored in the same 
area and were in a poor or unusable state.
Industrially produced AK-type arm found in the possession of a 
presumed Seleka-affiliated fighter from the Central African Republic, 
arrested on the DRC side of the border (photo taken off a FARDC soldier's 
mobile phone, Gbadolite, October 2015)
52 \ The CNC-ALPC conducted a study that examined the production 
of artisanal weapons as one area of investigation along with the 
marking of regular weapons in January 2015. Despite several 
requests by the team to be provided with this report report, they 
were not given it at the time of publication of this study. Another 
publication on artisanal weapons in the (other departments of the) 
DRC (Berghezan, 2015) also outlines several key issues.
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Analysis
The evaluation team did not find any verifiable 
evidence of this cross-border trade or the manu-
facture of artisanal weapons beyond anecdotal 
accounts, and it strongly recommended that such 
claims be substantiated on the basis of concrete 
evidence only. Rumours regarding the trade and the 
manufacture of artisanal weapons have the potential 
to catalyze unrest or increase insecurity among the 
communities in the area. Extreme caution is there-
fore recommended about how information regarding 
these issues is transmitted by the authorities.
The team recorded the presence of several obsolete 
and unusable weapons and assorted parts, including 
receivers and advised that these weapons should be 
destroyed or securely disposed of as soon as possible 
to prevent the risk of diversion.
Summary of key findings 
Infrastructure
 \  None of the buildings inspected were adapted 
to the storage of arms and ammunition. 
 \  A system to provide adequate ventilation were 
also absent.
 \  All openings, be they windows, doors or the 
ceiling were not adequately secured with a 
grill, which risks that weapons and ammuni-
tion are passed in or out of the store—greatly 
increasing the danger of diversion and 
decreasing the potential for accountability. 
Ideally, a small opening in a grilled, reinforced 
door should be used to pass the weapons in and 
out of the storage site. 
 \  Basic measures such as using proper locks, a 
double-lock system or securing the weapons 
with a lock and a chain were not being used. 
A US-manufactured Colt M16A1 series 5.56mm rifle, three functional and one unusable Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles stored on the floor of the office of
the PNC commander in Mobayi Mbongo. To the right of the rifles, concealed behind a plank, are two Baikal style artisanal shotguns chambered for
.00 cartridges.
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 \  The key was not stored in a lockable box under 
guard at the site but rather carried on the 
person of the officer in charge. This practice 
is extremely widespread in the DRC and the 
wider region and is very problematic: If the 
officer were to be robbed or be injured away 
from the armoury none of the other officers 
can access the armoury in times of need. 
 \  A reliable electric system, or a generator was 
absent.
Practice-based findings and recommendations:
 \  Large amounts of obsolete and out of service 
weapons as well as essential parts including 
receivers, bolts and barrels were mixed with 
weapons in active service.  
Recommendation: Separate out of service 
from active service weapons. Destroy or 
dispose of out of service weapons and their 
parts to prevent them from being re-used. 
 \  Equipment used for crowd control such as 
smoke or shock hand-throwing grenades were 
found mixed with other munitions or stored in 
the commandant’s letterbox along with a pair 
of handcuffs.  
Recommendation: Weapons, ammunition 
and specialized policing equipment should be 
stored separately. 
 \  A bullet capture device to enable firing of 
the weapons in a safe direction to complete 
weapons safety protocols was absent.  
Recommendation: A bullet capture device 
should be procured or manufactured locally. 
 \  The register of weapons in functional condi-
tion contained in the storage site was well 
maintained.  
Recommendation: Keep the register up-to-
date
 \ The presence of large amounts of  out-of-service 
weapons and essential parts including 
receivers, bolts and barrels was poorly docu-
mented and their presence increases the risk 
of diversion, as there is a possibility that these 
parts might be scavenged and used in arti-
sanal weapons manufacturing processes.  
Recommendation: Obsolete and out of service 
weapons and parts should be documented 
to prevent diversion. They should then be 
destroyed as soon as possible.
 \  Other, partially flammable, materials were 
stored together with weapons and ammuni-
tion in the same storage site.  
Recommendation: The storage site should be 
cleaned, and all other objects and flammable 
material such as paper, wood and cooking oil 
should be removed from the site.
 \  There were no safety signs including emer-
gency response numbers, explosive catego-
ries or basic signage prohibiting smoking or 
restricting the use of transistor radios or cell 
phones.  
Recommendation: These low-cost measures 
should be taken as soon as possible.
 \  The presence of personnel not qualified to work 
in the storage site was also documented.  
Recommendation: Forbid or at least limit 
the access of non-qualified personnel to the 
armoury.
 \  Armourers were often not adequately trained.  
Recommendation: Adequate training should 
be provided to those working directly in the 
armouries. 
48mm smoke and shock hand-throwing grenades stored in the 
 commandant’s letterbox along with a pair of handcuffs.
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Location
The armoury of the 11th naval forces group in 
Mbandaka is situated in a large field in an old, single 
story rectangular construction that has three main 
chambers. Two smaller chambers share a wall with 
a third larger chamber with an outdoor covered 
veranda and covered sitting space under the same 
roof but outside of the main building as demon-
strated in Figure 1. 
General description
The first and smallest of these chambers (Chamber
A, Figure 1) is being used to house the armoury of
the naval forces. This small chamber also contains
munitions including live small arms ammunition.
Some of these magazines containing live ammu-
nition were found loaded into rifles without being
labelled or stored separately. Two walls contained
seven wooden shelves designed to hold assault
rifles in a prone position. The areas on the floor on
the third wall was used to prop up several larger or
longer rifles including a Thompson Model 1928A1
submachine gun and a number of FN-FAL 7.62mm
Chamber D:
Housing for a soldier and his family
Chamber B:
Clinic with bed Covered area C
Clinic: Outdoor area (E)
waiting space on veranda
Clinic: desk, diagnosis
by medical practitioner
Bed
Chest
Window
Desk
Chamber A:
Armoury
Visual Narrative:  
Health Clinic & Armoury, Mbandaka
Name of Armoury:  11th Group, DRC Naval Forces  
Date: 24 September 2015
Location: Mbandaka, Province Equateur, DRC
Figure 1: Building setup
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rifles. Several unusable weapons and weapon parts 
including frames and receivers as well as trigger 
assemblies and unusable magazines were piled on 
the floor and the lower shelf on one main wall.
The second chamber (Chamber B, Figure 1) shares a 
wall with a veranda that are together being used as a 
health clinic. Patients are received at a desk outside 
the main building, under the same roof as the main 
building. Waiting patients are seated on a rough 
wooden bench around the desk where a medical 
practitioner conducts the diagnosis and prescribes 
treatment and medication. Most of the patients are 
women with young children and at least two of the 
medical practitioners the evaluation team spoke 
with stated they focused on paediatric care.
That chamber contains a single clinical bed and no 
other furniture except cardboard boxes containing 
papers and medical supplies. When the evaluation 
team visited the site, a seven-year old girl was being 
treated for dehydration by the medical practitioner. 
She was lying on the bed along with her mother 
where the medical practitioner proceeded to admin-
ister a saline drip. The evaluation team observed that 
an MIT50 calibre Browning-style heavy machine 
gun was stored below the bed. The explanation for 
this from the armourer was that there was simply 
no more space available in the dedicated room to 
store the arms and ammunition and the MIT50 had 
been placed under the bed because ‘the space was 
available’. 
There is also a large chest outside of the room and 
by the wall where the armoury is located. This chest 
contains medical supplies including prescription 
drugs, saline drips, syringes and first aid material. 
Standing on this chest provides easy access to a large 
open space or ‘window’ between the arms and muni-
tion storage area and the open, outside corridor. This 
window is large enough to easily pass more than one 
assault rifle with a magazine attached through this 
space. 
There is no grill or lockable window or door frame 
in any part of this structure where the windows are 
‘unbricked’ areas of wall that are left open or covered 
by a cloth curtain.
The fourth and largest chamber (Chamber D) houses 
one soldier and his seven family members, including 
four young children. This fourth chamber is only 
divided from the other three by a partial brick wall 
and a thick cloth curtain. 
A care-giver provides patients with medicine as other mothers with 
 children wait their turn. The diagnosis and waiting area is directly in 
front of the weapons storage area of the 11th Naval Group in Mbandaka.
A M2 .50 calibre Browning-style heavy machine gun stored below the
bed where a young girl is being treated for dehydration.
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Personnel, training and access
The armourer was present and was willing to speak 
to the evaluation team on request of his superior 
officer. He accompanied the team through the whole 
visit and co-operated fully as the team emptied 
out the weapons from the chamber, counted them, 
recorded the type, variants, calibre, year of manufac-
ture and country of origin and tallied this with the 
official ledger/register before returning them to the 
armoury. 
The armourer had received specialized training in 
the United States, which was an exception to many 
of the other weapons and munitions storage site 
visited. The weapons were maintained in excellent 
condition and had been regularly serviced. Some 
specialized equipment including specific tools and 
brushes to oil and clean the weapons had been 
placed in a basin along with a tin of oil. The records 
in the register were also fairly well maintained 
although some discrepancies were discovered during 
the visit. The presence of several out-of- service or 
unusable weapons and surplus magazines was, 
however, not recorded in the register. Obsolete 
weapons including a Thompson Model 1928A1 .45 
calibre submachine gun from the Second World War 
were also found in the storage site.
A large number of obsolete weapons were stored in the armoury  
despite the limited space available.
??? \ ???The functional weapons in the armoury, such as this AK47 mounted 
with an under-barrel 40mm grenade launcher, were serviced and oiled 
on a regular basis.
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Several obsolete weapons and parts  of weapons found in the armoury 
were not documented, increasing the risk of diversion.
Summary of key findings and recommendations 
 \  The armoury is located in the same building 
as a medical centre—an arrangement that is 
in direct contravention of PSSM standards and 
SOPs. The fact that a 50 calibre machine gun 
was stored directly underneath the bed in the 
medical centre clearly illustrates the extent to 
which this principle has been ignored.
 \  This building is not adapted to the storage of 
such sensitive arms and ammunition. 
 \  A system to provide adequate ventilation was 
absent. 
 \  Evidence of water seepage was also discovered 
which will corrode both arms and ammuni-
tion if left unchecked. 
 \  All openings, be they windows, doors or the 
ceiling were not adequately secured with a 
grill, which risks that weapons and ammuni-
tion are passed in or out of the store—greatly 
increasing the danger of diversion and 
decreasing the potential for accountability. 
Ideally, a small opening in a grilled, reinforced 
door should be used to pass the weapons in and 
out of the storage site. 
 \  Basic measures such as using proper locks 
or putting in place a double-lock system or 
securing the weapons with a lock and a chain 
were not taken. A reliable electric system or a 
generator is absent. The team had to visit the 
site in the day time and due to the dark and 
cramped space inside the armoury still used 
flashlights to examine the weapons. These 
weapons were then moved out to the open 
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area in order to categorize them and tally 
them with the numbers and types of weapons 
entered in the register maintained by the 
armourer. 
Based on this exercise, further observations and 
recommendations were made:
 \  Obsolete and out of service weapons were 
mixed with weapons in active service.  
Recommendation: Remove and/or destroy 
obsolete and out of service weapons.
 \  Live ammunition was found in the weapons 
storage area, including loaded into magazines, 
some of which were found loaded into the rifles 
as well.  
Recommendation: Weapons and ammunition 
should be stored separately.
 \  Several weapons were found with the ‘safety 
off’, that is, the lever to operate the safety 
device was not placed in the safe position.  
Recommendation: Weapons should always be 
stored with the safety mechanism engaged.
 \  Other, partially flammable, materials such as 
cardboard boxes, oil to service the weapons 
and provisions were stored together with 
weapons and ammunition.  
Recommendation: The storage site should be 
cleaned, and all other objects and flammable 
material such as paper, wood and cooking oil 
should be removed from the site.
 \  There were no safety signs including emer-
gency response numbers, explosive catego-
ries or basic signage prohibiting smoking or 
restricting the use of transistor radios or cell 
phones.  
Recommendation: These low-cost measures 
should be taken as soon as possible.
 \  There was no bullet capture device to complete 
weapons safety protocol.  
Recommendation: A bullet capture device 
that allows the owner of the weapon to fire 
the weapon in a safe direction to complete 
weapons safety protocols and ensure that no 
ammunition was accidentally lodged in the 
chamber of the weapon despite removing the 
magazine should be procured or manufactured 
locally. The register of weapons contained in 
the storage site was well maintained.  
Recommendation: Keep the register up-to-
date
 \  The presence of personnel not qualified to work 
in the storage site was also documented.  
Recommendation: Forbid or at least limit 
the access of non-qualified personnel to the 
armoury.
In this particular case, to safeguard such a large 
number of weapons stored in such a confined space 
one of the following three options must be taken 
into consideration:
 \  Construct a new, dedicated storage site at the 
same location and move the medical centre to 
a different location;
 \  Make use of a secure, purpose built container 
to store the weapons and ammunition. The 
container should contain separate lockable 
compartments to store the ammunition as 
well as a lockable rack system to securely store 
the weapons;
 \  Move the arms and ammunition to a facility 
designed to safely and securely house this 
sensitive material at the earliest possible 
opportunity.
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Police records, coffee cups and 64mm cyanocarbon 'tear gas' grenades share shelf-space in a police outpost near the Central African Republic border  
in Nord-Oubangui Province.
Analysis
This section first analyses PSSM-relevant policy initiatives including the estab-
lishment of the National SALW Commission (CNC-ALPC), the 2012–2016 National 
Action Plan on SALW control and the extent of cooperation among key PSSM 
authorities as well as the clarity of communication procedures through the 
PSSM hierarchy. Next, key issues relevant to transforming theoretical or norma-
tive standards into concrete results are discussed. In this context, increasing the 
level of available PSSM expertise through targeted trainings is reiterated. Finally, 
emphasis is placed on paying greater attention to context-specific cultural factors 
such as how ‘memory and forgetting’ play a role in why addressing PSSM-related 
dangers may not always be prioritised in the DRC, despite the obvious risks.
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PSSM policy and action
Actors in the DRC have a long track record of 
engaging in international policy efforts to bring the 
proliferation of SALW under control: The DRC signed 
the UN PoA and no less than four  sub-regional 
arrangements to further the implementation of the 
Programme. These arrangements include clear activ-
ities and a strategic direction on PSSM management. 
They also opened the door to many international 
cooperation and assistance schemes for PSSM work 
in the DRC. The Congolese government has put in 
place the structures to coordinate and boost such 
activity, the most prominent being the National 
SALW Commission (CNC-ALPC), which is responsible 
for co-ordinating all arms control-related activities 
in the DRC.  To this end, the CNC-ALPC has drafted 
a National Action Plan (NAP) that envisages specific 
activities on PSSM. 
This study’s section on “Legal framework, policy 
and SOPs” (p. 22 ff.) has provided grounds to doubt 
whether the DRC’s key policy instruments, such as 
the 2012-2016 National Action Plan adequately reflect 
the priority to make PSSM safer and more secure. 
Although the policy documents revealed that the 
CNC-ALPC envisaged certain PSSM activities in the 
2012–2016 NAP, the allotted budget shows the low 
priority attributed to these activities: Relatively 
modestly budgeted PSSM activities contrast with 
more generously budgeted ‘soft’ activities such as 
commemorating the days that certain conventions 
were signed, as well as professionalizing the media 
in general and empowering civil society to raise 
awareness on unspecified SALW issues. 
Similarly, in the National Action Plan, the CNC-ALPC 
is tasked with the leading role in improving PSSM 
practices in the country. In implementation, 
however, the CNC-ALPC’s PSSM work was seen to 
proceed in relative isolation from what was being 
done in this field by the FARDC and international 
actors who, for instance, operate a joint PSSM 
working group that the CNC-ALPC has not attended 
since 2014. 
This observation speaks to the fact that, as with 
many other countries in the region and further 
afield, tensions often develop between civilian 
commissions tasked with coordinating arms control 
activities and their military partners responsible 
for implementing these activities. In the DRC, the 
CNC-ALPC is responsible for co-ordinating all action 
on controlling small arms and light weapons and 
related activities including PSSM while the FARDC 
is the military implementing partner that engages 
in ‘hard’ activities. As mandated by the NAP, and 
according to its own mandate, the CNC-ALPC contin-
ues to play the role of the interlocutor through which 
it believes all international actors should channel 
their SALW control activities in the DRC—includ-
ing on PSSM—in the interest of developing a more 
effectively coordinated approach to arms control 
that avoids replication of relevant activities.53 Yet, 
from observations of practice and reliable accounts, 
the CNC-ALPC appeared to be playing a much more 
marginal role than if it were to realize its potential 
as a fully-empowered national commission.
These parallel structures in place and the resulting 
lack of clarity about who is responsible for PSSM 
matters in the DRC has direct consequences for 
the management of the country’s armouries. Not 
only does the lack of clear hierarchy permit truly 
alarming situations such as at Bokala camp, it 
also makes it less likely that those in charge will 
manage to safely dispose or destroy the obsolete 
and dangerous larger calibre munitions present in 
several armouries. The continued presence of these 
munitions in the armouries will most likely protract 
unsafe PSSM cultures.
53 \ Observations from various meetings with CNC-ALPC staff.
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The information available in the autumn of 2015 
made it impossible to anticipate the role that the 
CNC-ALPC will play in future PSSM activities under 
the newly (re)asserted presidential command over 
such matters. However, political developments since 
the beginning of 2016 appear to have clarified the 
roles of the institutions involved in PSSM, including 
that of the CNC-ALPC. It appears to be playing a 
more prominent role, such as playing the lead role 
in coordinating a weapons marking programme in 
Kinshasa, launched in January 2016. While PSSM 
and weapons control programmes have been prior-
itized to a greater extent, it would also be crucial to 
observe how the Presidential elections scheduled for 
2016 proceed before the longer-term implications of 
these developments can be fully understood. 
Training, knowledge and  
action discrepancies 
The assessment of PSSM facilities and infrastructure 
in the previous sections as well as in the separate 
technical report by MAG identifies several factors 
that hinder responsible PSSM practices from taking 
root. For example, the practices found in place 
appeared “tolerant” of the fact that boxes are simply 
stored on the ground as no pallets are available 
to safely store munitions boxes. The presence of 
rodents and termites that ate through the wooden 
boxes in several locations was also not addressed. 
Heads of police stations and FARDC facilities tended 
to recognize that these practices and many other 
deficiencies have an impact on the safety, security 
and accountability in and around stockpiles. Yet that 
recognition did not lead to basic interventions, such 
as simply cleaning up the facilities, ordering the 
removal of food or flammable objects from the stor-
ages, procuring wooden pallets from local sources, 
purchasing locks and cables to secure weapons on 
easy-to-build storage racks or installing basic metal 
grills on ceilings and in front of windows. Few 
efforts were shown to be made to communicate these 
security needs further up the hierarchical chain 
to reach authorities who could then take action to 
address these problems. 
The BICC-MAG technical report accompanying this 
Knowledge Note also points out that personnel in 
charge of the visited sites at the operational level had 
received insufficient specialized training to do their 
job safely. Relevant training and the insights gained 
through it were sometimes found available on the 
site, but this was often with higher ranked officials 
rather than those physically working with the stock-
piles on a daily basis. 
There appears to be a mismatch between trainings 
available and the use of available training oppor-
tunities, at the least in the case of FARDC officers. 
PNC respondents reported that PNC personnel were 
less likely to be allotted a training place generally 
believed to be reserved for FARDC, and were unaware 
of capacity-building programmes specifically 
designed for police management. While it is clear 
that policemen serving in the regional antennae 
would not normally be aware of such opportunities, 
it is the duty of their superiors in Kinshasa to ensure 
that staff attend available trainings. Such trainings 
are provided by the Southern African Regional Police 
Chiefs Cooperation Organization while others are 
provided by organizations such as BICC and MAG 
in close cooperation with the Verification Centre of 
the German Armed Forces, the International Peace 
Support Training Centre and the Regional Centre for 
Small Arms (RECSA) in Nairobi, Kenya. Recommen-
dations on how to address the lack of training are 
further discussed in the next section.
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Deficient facilities and the unavailability of training 
for those who need it most, is characteristic to a 
situation seen to recur in almost all of the visited 
sites. There is a discrepancy on the one hand 
between what some actors afield know or are aware 
‘should be the case’ in and around their stockpiles as 
prescribed in their own aide-mémoires as a norma-
tive standard, and practices and approaches found 
in reality on the other. Amongst the more striking 
examples of this disconnect between what should be 
and what actually is the case, is the brief inventory 
of prior efforts (undertaken by many, including MAG 
and FARDC état major) to bring urgent attention to 
the safety situation at Bokala and call for immediate 
remediation by the relevant authorities, thus far in 
vain. The situation illustrates a remarkable mixture 
of clear memories (the accident at the facility where 
the explosives were stored until 2007, as well as the 
far more recent explosion of a munitions storage 
facility in neighbouring Republic of the Congo), and 
an apparent ability ‘to forget’—or at least suppress—
the awareness that a similar accident can wipe out 
thousands at and around Bokala camp at any time. 
A number of reasons were given to explain why no 
action has been taken—including a selective under-
standing of what international actors can intend to 
achieve when they undertake a study. At the local 
level, and as perceived by those most in harm’s way, 
these explanations appeared to render the state inac-
tion “legitimate”, and all but stop such discrepancies 
from occurring. Yet essential, specialized training 
and knowledge is lacking as well as clarity about 
how to move forward and precisely who and which 
channels to mobilize to do so. The distinct lack of 
capacity to achieve this, results in a de facto tolerance 
or apathy that protracts a highly unsafe situation. 
Finally, some local community members perceived 
urgent everyday realities such as the lack of access 
to clean drinking water, provision of adequate food 
for dependents and access to basic medical care as 
more tangible threats than a potential explosion in a 
munitions depot. Taking into account local cultural 
realities and differing understandings of risk will 
therefore be essential to design and deliver effective, 
tailored PSSM programming in the DRC.
Training alone, however, cannot transform this 
theoretical knowledge into action on the ground. 
Even ‘training of trainer’ programmes have been 
run before in the DRC with limited results. The gap 
between theory and practice must be bridged so 
that this theoretical knowledge can have a tangible 
impact on safe, responsible PSSM and related arms 
control practices on the ground. For a culture of 
responsible PSSM practice to develop and take root in 
the DRC, national ownership and tailored program-
ming will need to be implemented in a coordinated, 
transparent and co-operative manner. 
In the next section, the reader can find a set of 
recommendations of how the authorities can estab-
lish and nurture a responsible PSSM culture.
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Safety mechanism on a US-American-manufactured Colt M16A1 5.56mm calibre assault rifle set to full auto-mode.
Recommendations for action
The analysis of PSSM practices in north-western DRC gives rise to a number of 
immediate and long-term, operational and institutional recommendations. More 
than any external action, this requires a conscious shift in attitudes and a willing-
ness to drastically change current practices on the ground. This is only possible 
by moving beyond the blame game and systemizing practices and protocols 
that enhance safety. Over time, this will require a transformation of theoretical 
 knowledge available in the form of PSSM SOPs and manuals into effective action. 
This next section highlights some concrete measures that will help lay the 
 foundations for a culture of safe and responsible PSSM and arms control.
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Immediate interventions
In the following, the authors recommend a number 
of action points that do not cost much and that 
would not require specific budgets but that will 
improve accountability and the security of stockpile 
holdings. The Congolese authorities should therefore 
take the initiative to implement these activities as 
soon as possible. These include:
Registers to record the movement of arms and 
ammunition
 \  Distribute registers/ledgers to monitor 
the movement of arms and ammunition, 
including the number of rounds. Make avail-
able basic instructions on how to fill this form 
or, ideally, distribute a template of essential 
information to record; this would systemati-
cally help such good practices.
Chains, locks and weapons racks 
 \  Make it more difficult to remove a weapon 
from the stockpile, thus reducing the danger of 
diversion or robbery. 
 \  Use chains, locks or racks to improve the 
accountability of these weapons as it wil 
become more difficult to move these weapons 
in and out of the armoury without it being 
noticed. This would also help reduce the 
‘renting out’ of military weapons at night for 
criminal purposes.
 \  Use good quality locks.
Access to armouries
 \  Ensure that access to the armoury and muni-
tions depots is controlled. Only qualified 
personnel should be allowed to enter and, 
ideally, they should have a clearly visible, 
photographic ID on them. 
 \  Increase the systemization of basic practices 
by making sure that the key to the armoury is 
kept in a locked box, away from the armoury 
or munitions depot but within the secure 
perimeter of the facility. To ensure rapid access 
to the weapons and ammunition whenever 
needed, the person responsible must not be 
allowed to take the key away from the facility 
or store this on his person or at his home. 
Safety protocols and practices
 \  Ensure that a carbon dioxide fire extinguisher 
is available at the entrance to the facility. If 
this is not possible, assure that at least buckets 
to extinguish fires are filled with sand.
 \  Proper signs prohibiting smoking and listing 
the emergency contact numbers for the fire 
service will also reduce response times in an 
emergency. 
 \  Ensure that fire classification signage is in 
place that denotes different classes of muni-
tions and explosives. This will guide fire-
fighters in case of an emergency.
 \  Train fire fighters in how to read these signs 
and, circumstances permitting, get them 
involved in a regular fire drill or simulation to 
assess the readiness of the staff in the event of 
an emergency.
 \  Ensure that only weapons and ammunition 
are stored in the designated site. Remove all 
other items, particularly those that pose a 
fire hazard, such as food stocks, cooking oil, 
automobile or machinery spares, tyres or brake 
fluid immediately and have the storage facili-
ties thoroughly cleaned. This will also prevent 
insects and rodents from eating away wooden 
storage boxes. 
 \  Have grass or vegetation around storage facili-
ties trimmed or removed to prevent fires.
Wooden pallets
 \  Ensure that wooden pallets are in use where 
weapons or ammunition boxes are stored in 
piles. This cost-effective method has been 
recommended by past assessments and 
ensures that sensitive arms and ammunition 
are properly ventilated. This increases their 
life span and makes them less prone to damage 
and corrosion. 
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Weapons safety protocols
 \  Make sure that weapons and ammunition are 
stored separately. 
 \  Verify that magazines do not contain live 
ammunition and are not loaded in a weapon. 
Not only does this pose a safety hazard as the 
weapon is loaded but also reduces the life of 
the magazines as it wears down the main 
spring.
 \  Upon receipt make the holder clear the weapon 
to make sure that no rounds are accidentally 
left in the chamber. Make him/her fire the 
weapon towards a bullet capturing device or 
“piège à balles”. Such a device is not expensive 
and can often be manufactured locally.
Perimeter security
 \  Ensure that in addition to the facilities 
themselves, the perimeter of facilities is also 
guarded. This is instrumental in increasing 
overall security of the PSSM facilities. This can 
be achieved by reorganizing existing patrol 
routines rather than hiring new personnel.
Medium-term interventions
Medium- to longer-term PSSM interventions require 
more time and planning and include—but are not 
limited to—the modification of infrastructure or the 
building of new, purpose-built facilities adapted to 
the requirements of safe weapons and ammunition 
storage.
Carry out basic infrastructural modifications of 
storage facilities
 \  Use reinforced doors.
 \  Check standards or PSSM SOPs for minimum 
standards for the size of reinforced concrete 
walls. 
 \  Encourage the installation of anti-intrusion 
grilles in front of windows and ceilings of 
buildings where arms are stored. 
Construct dedicated storage facilities
 \  In certain conditions, it is not safe to continue 
to use facilities that are not designed for the 
storage of sensitive arms and ammunition. 
Depending on resources available and the 
urgency to house high quantities of explosive 
in a dedicated, safe environment it is crucial 
to construct dedicated facilities to serve this 
purpose.
 \  The report along with the technical report by 
MAG outlines several of these examples. As 
has been made clear in the MAG assessment, 
the rule of thumb is that facilities containing 
more than a hundred weapons demand the 
use of a modified shipping container or an 
alternative, purpose-built storage facility. At 
the very minimum, secure, lockable spaces for 
ammunition and weapons need to be ensured 
within the modified shipping container or in 
a dedicated armoury to avoid weapons and 
ammunition being stored together.
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Conduct needs assessments and baseline PSSM 
assessments
 \  Identify needs of practitioners as well as 
affected communities through needs assess-
ments and perception surveys to ensure that 
interventions are tailored to specific condi-
tions.
 \  Avoid transferring a one-size fits all approach 
to different socio-economic, cultural or tech-
nical contexts.
 \  A PSSM baseline assessment serves to create a 
baseline that serves as a measurable indicator 
of progress, highlighting key areas of inter-
vention and assisting with prioritising limited 
resources.
 \  Use evidence generated from these assess-
ments to inform strategic documents such as 
the National Action Plan to ensure that these 
documents serves as a roadmap or action plan 
to coordinate, monitor and evaluate arms 
control initiatives including PSSM-related 
and other complementary activities being 
conducted within the country.
Clarify roles and responsibilities
Intermediate-term action is also recommended on 
the institutional front.
 \  Clarify the ownership and position of PSSM-
work in the hierarchies and different forces in 
practical terms.
 \  Make sure that actors responsible for PSSM 
such as the CNC-ALPC, FARDC and CCLAM 
work together in a co-operative and trans-
parent manner, making full use of co- 
ordinating mechanisms such as the PSSM 
Working Group to avoid repetition and fill any 
identified gaps.
 \  Make use of opportunities to coordinate 
with related or complementary work being 
conducted in other countries in the wider 
region provided by RECSA and other regional 
organizations.
Longer–term interventions 
PSSM programmes are complex, and resources—
financial and human—are limited. To improve 
established practices and behaviour takes time, 
and donors or international agencies should recog-
nize this reality. They should prioritize longer-term 
funding for PSSM activities in the DRC over short-
term projects and take care to avoid duplicating 
efforts at the national level. Specific, targeted 
projects ought to fill gaps where national PSSM 
expertise is lacking or weak. Ideally, these projects 
should in turn be part of a larger programme of 
assistance that is run in cooperation and coordi-
nation with relevant regional arms control initi-
atives to encourage cross-border cooperation and 
 knowledge-sharing.
Towards a concrete SALW strategy: Making PSSM a 
priority in the upcoming National Action Plan
A more comprehensive understanding of the many 
relevant factors at play, including the motivations for 
illicit SALW possession, should feed in to a concrete, 
coordinated strategy towards addressing deeper 
causes of conflict and its integration into wider 
conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding 
efforts. Risks should be identified early rather than 
having to amend plans in retrospect. 
The DRC’s current National Action Plan (NAP) is one 
potential strategic framework to work with towards 
this end. The NAP’s current five-year term is about to 
end in 2016. This presents a valuable opportunity to 
refocus priorities of the NAP for the next five years 
and potentially include language to help orient the 
activities of the National SALW Commission and 
other actors working on PSSM. A realistically budg-
eted section on PSSM as well as clearer articulation 
of roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by the 
Commission in PSSM could be possible outcomes of 
such an exercise. 
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Enhanced coordination at four levels 
Unit level: Local cultural realities must be taken 
into account when designing and delivering PSSM 
programmes in the DRC. How risks are assessed 
and threats are perceived, how events are remem-
bered and forgotten are only some of these realities 
which need to be better understood. This is why it 
is important to conduct PSSM baseline assessments 
and security needs assessments before a large-scale 
programme is designed so that in the end it can 
better respond to the needs of local communities. For 
a culture of responsible PSSM practice to develop and 
take root in the DRC, developing programming that 
is nationally owned is crucial.
National level: To make progress, strengthen coop-
eration and coordination amongst all actors respon-
sible for PSSM including the national co-ordinating 
bodies such as the CNC-ALPC, CCLAM and the mili-
tary actors responsible for ultimately implementing 
these activities, including FARDC, in particular the 
Regional Destruction Centre at the Central Logistics 
Base in Kinshasa. Use co-ordinating mechanisms 
such as the PSSM Working Group at the national 
level better. Identify competent authorities and map 
out proper channels to acquire information or draft 
and transmit PSSM-related requests to those author-
ities who can help bring about more enduring solu-
tions in the longer term. These could include basic 
requests for clearance of obsolete or unstable muni-
tions or weapons as well as a request to construct 
a whole new armoury or storage facility. Provide 
access to a basic template on how to request PSSM- 
related activities to armourers, logisticians and 
stockpile managers. Make armourers and all others 
who deal with PSSM-related activities aware of the 
correct channels to forward this through, starting 
with their immediate superior all the way to the 
responsible officer at the Logistics Base in Kinshasa.
The research team attempted to map out these chan-
nels and develop a basic handout or tool to facilitate 
communication through the hierarchy during the 
assessment period but the limited time period and 
scope of this study did not allow for that. The devel-
opment and dissemination of such a handout would 
bring greater clarity of roles and responsibilities thus 
making the implementation of PSSM-related activi-
ties effective and efficient.
Regional level: When conducted effectively, physical 
security and stockpile management (PSSM) is one 
ground-level process that contributes to building 
the basic infrastructure for arms control in difficult 
conflict or fragile environments. National author-
ities need to coordinate PSSM activities with other 
such processes such as efforts to register and mark 
regular and illicit weapons as well as tracing and 
record-keeping initiatives that contribute to building 
this basic framework.
PSSM and arms control initiatives not only have to 
focus on the regulation of weapons but also be aware 
of the high volume of global traffic in illegal cross-
border trade of high-value commodities other than 
firearms. Illegal trade in illicit substances, endan-
gered species products as well as the trafficking 
of human beings is often facilitated by non-state 
groups armed with illicit weapons and ammunition 
and consequently intrinsically linked to efforts to 
regulate and control the illicit weapons trade.
At the regional level, national authorities ought to 
support training opportunities provided by RECSA 
and efforts to enhance cooperation and coordination 
on arms control by other regional organisations such 
as the African Union. 
They should also enhance cross-border cooperation 
between countries in this field and encourage joint 
arms control initiatives with neighbouring countries.
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Global level: At the global level, ensure that the 
DRC’s chances for funding are improved through 
more accurate reporting to existing international 
arms control instruments such as the PoA and by 
supporting projects and activities domestically that 
contribute to an evidence-based approach to arms 
control. 
Support national arms control projects that have 
demonstrable, measurable results by conducting 
baseline assessments as well as regular monitoring 
and evaluation activities. This will make demands 
for specific, targeted assistance from international 
donors more successful. 
Effective arms control cannot take place in isolation. 
Therefore, optimize the flow of information and 
expertise between the whole range of actors at the 
national, regional and global level to avoid duplica-
tion, and fill gaps in PSSM and related arms control 
interventions. Encourage joint border forces, cross-
border cooperation and joint study visits by coun-
tries affected by SALW-related armed violence but 
tailor them to specific contexts.
Ensuring specialized training is a precondition to a 
responsible, safe PSSM culture
The technical report by MAG recommends adequate 
and specific training for each of the different forces 
whose sites were assessed and identified three 
general challenges: 
 \  The role of an armourer is often unenviable 
as they stand the risk of being blamed for an 
unintentional explosion or other things that 
could go wrong, having inherited challenges 
that exist as a result of systemic issues and 
negative practices in place long before they 
took over the position.
 \  The personnel assigned to PSSM are not 
adequately trained. This, however, is a precon-
dition for a culture of safe PSSM practices. As 
is obvious from several examples outlined 
in the body of this study and the technical 
assessments, it is impossible to create a safe 
environment where sensitive weapons and 
ammunition are managed without the requi-
site training. 
 \  Those who are in charge of the stockpiles and 
have received specific training are often moved 
after their training is completed to a different 
role without transmitting those skills to other 
candidates. This is discussed further in the 
next point with reference to the “training of 
trainers” programme. 
Maximizing the use of training opportunities and 
strengthening a ‘training of trainers’ approach
Again, the international policy standards and the 
realities on the ground appear disconnected, which 
creates a greater need to coordinate and integrate 
national priorities into regional frameworks. To 
achieve an improvement in PSSM practices, training 
opportunities must target those who would benefit 
most—the armourers and stockpile managers or 
logistical staff working at the unit level in the 
armouries on a daily basis. This is why unit-level 
PSSM trainings should be a national and regional 
priority. 
Institutions responsible for improving PSSM 
standards should make maximum use of available 
training opportunities. One such opportunity is 
provided by the Southern African Regional Police 
Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO), which 
the DRC would have access to as a member of the 
SADC. 
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Others are provided by organizations such as BICC 
who are working in cooperation with agencies such 
as the Verification Centre of the German Armed 
Forces, the International Peace Support Training 
Centre and the Regional Centre for Small Arms 
(RECSA) in Nairobi, Kenya, to provide a system of 
tailored PSSM trainings. The objective is to move 
away from the dependency on Western training 
institutions by certifying a new batch of candidates 
nominated from African states as national PSSM 
instructors. The newly trained instructors would 
then transmit their knowledge to those responsible 
for managing arms and ammunition stockpiles in 
their own countries through a ‘training of trainers’ 
approach. 
It is strongly recommended that the DRC take full 
advantage of these training opportunities as this 
would increase the level of national expertise to 
cultivate a responsible PSSM culture. As these train-
ings are done in close coordination with regional 
security organizations as well as neighbouring 
countries who also suffer from the lack of adequately 
trained personnel, joint trainings and systematic 
sharing of knowledge and lessons learned would 
have a positive impact on the wider region as well
Finally, it is worth noting that training of trainer 
programmes have been tried in the past to varying 
degrees of success. Trainings alone cannot serve as 
a panacea to resolve the deeply embedded problems 
around weapons proliferation and related attempts 
to improve their storage and security. Beyond 
training, a profound shift in attitudes and behaviour 
is necessary to transform this theoretical knowl-
edge into action on the ground and to lay the ground 
work for the effective management of weapons and 
ammunition stockpiles. For this to happen, patience, 
time and resources for developing a programme of 
action tailored to the realities on the ground in the 
DRC and the wider region is required. To achieve 
this, national authorities must take greater respon-
sibility and initiative to resolve these issues as best 
as possible, cultivating a more responsible culture 
around the physical security and stockpile manage-
ment of weapons and ammunition in the DRC.
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In Mobutu’s abandoned former palace in Gbadolite, men play ludo on a handmade board divided into four quadrants each marked with  
M23, CNDP, FARDC and Mai-Mai.
Conclusion
To improve the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of arms and 
ammunition in the DRC, as in many other complex post-conflict contexts in the 
region, is a challenge. The objective of this assessment is not to point out flaws 
or merely blame the current authorities tasked with the unsatisfactory role of 
managing the storage and security of weapons and ammunition owned by the 
various branches of the Congolese Armed Forces and police forces. Nor is the aim 
of this study to blindly advocate the implementation of the international small 
arms control standards for PSSM in an environment where resources—financial, 
material and human—are limited, and where the necessary knowledge on how to 
conduct these tasks safely is either absent or locked away in an unused theoretical 
manual but far from integrated into practice. 
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This study analyzes key findings from a PSSM assess-
ment conducted in Equateur and Nord-Oubangui 
Provinces of north-western DRC, highlights areas of 
intervention and makes basic recommendations for 
action to help relevant Congolese authorities address 
their PSSM-related challenges more effectively. In 
the longer term, this study aims to contribute to the 
process of establishing a more responsible culture 
around the storage, security and management of 
weapons and ammunition at the national level that 
may even have far-reaching implications for effective 
arms control in the wider region.
This study was made possible with the financial 
support of the German Federal Foreign Office and 
with the full cooperation of the Congolese author-
ities who recognized the mutual benefits of such a 
PSSM assessment in a remote area of their vast and 
resource-rich country that had not been extensively 
studied before despite being located at the crossroads 
of several interlinked regional security dynamics. 
The assessment team is grateful for the hospitality 
and for the high level of access provided to sensitive 
military facilities by the Congolese authorities, facil-
itated by the CNC-ALPC. One the one hand, the team 
observed several positive and negative practices with 
regard to the management of weapons and ammu-
nition while on the other, it constantly encountered 
a willingness to improve demonstrated by several 
concerned individuals despite limited facilities and 
resources. 
The problems at hand, however, cannot be addressed 
by the individuals alone but rather need to be viewed 
through a much longer historical lens, taking their 
relevant socio-economic and cultural context into 
account. It would be a mistake to merely address 
the technical flaws and shortcomings observed in a 
limited period of time and expect to apply the results 
and recommendations to the rest of the country, 
much less the wider region. Certain key lessons 
have been learned and specific findings might have 
relevance for countries in the region facing similarly 
difficult armed violence-related problems with simi-
larly limited resources. 
The regulation of most illicit commodities that 
generate their own demand and are available 
relatively easily requires a regional, cross-border 
approach to be effective, and illicit weapons and 
ammunition are no exception. What has become 
clear is that the wide range of challenges facing 
PSSM in the north-western part of the DRC is 
systemic and deeply rooted in practices that have 
been followed, passed down and concretized over 
decades. But rather than merely treating the symp-
toms, the Congolese authorities need to apply a 
tailored, holistic and comprehensive approach 
that takes local realities and human concerns into 
consideration. 
Consequently, the Congolese authorities will need 
time and patience when gradually addressing the 
issues and putting in place the conditions that 
may hopefully lead to a positive change in terms of 
current practices and behaviour. 
Paying closer attention to factors that are often over-
looked but might provide the most valuable insights 
into why things remain this way for decades and 
refuse to change is not a luxury but crucial to devel-
oping enduring programmes that have a realistic 
chance of achieving their goals. Understanding how 
decision-making processes work, how memories 
are built and forgotten, why perceptions of risk and 
assessments of threats differ geographically and 
depend on whether communities have access to bare 
necessities such as clean drinking water will help 
practitioners design and deliver PSSM programmes 
that have a tangible impact.
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To avoid duplication and optimize the use of limited 
resources it is necessary to promote cooperation 
within the various branches of the military and 
national authorities as well as enhance the coordina-
tion of PSSM and other complementary arms control 
activities with specialized international actors and 
donors. Teaching staff tasked with key roles and 
responsibilities within a PSSM framework such as 
the armourers, logisticians and stockpile managers 
at the unit level as well as their immediate supe-
rior officers the skills necessary to safely manage 
the storage, maintenance, destruction, disposal 
and security of arms and ammunition across their 
full life cycle should be taken seriously. Basic and 
low-cost short and medium term activities that 
directly improve the security of existing weapons 
and ammunition stockpiles need to be implemented 
without further delay at the initiative of the camp 
commanders and Congolese authorities themselves. 
One priority should be to dispose of and to destroy 
unstable munitions and unusable or out of service 
weapons. National authorities such as CCLAM with 
the support of capable organizations such as MAG 
have the authority to do so upon request of the rele-
vant authorities following due legal process. Longer 
term interventions including those that demand 
organizations such as MAG to provide specialized 
services or that rely on the support of interna-
tional donors need to be communicated through 
proper channels efficiently and on time.  Agencies 
providing assistance need to be supported and their 
activities coordinated effectively to ensure that goals 
are met and expectations are managed. 
Finally, relevant PSSM baseline studies or security 
needs assessments are an essential first step to 
identify the interest of communities affected by the 
cross-border dynamics—whether by the illicit diver-
sion of weapons for criminal use or whether they are 
at risk from the impact of an unintentional muni-
tions explosion. Their interests must remain firmly 
at the centre of this decision-making process.
SAFETY FIRST \ ACHARYA, GRUMEL & VRANCKX
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 2 \ 201680 \
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ANR DRC Intelligence Agency  ANR
BICC Bonn International Center for Conversion BICC
CAR Central African Republic CAR
CCLAM Centre Congolais de la Lutte Antimines  CCLAM
CNC-ALPC  National Commission for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons  CNC-ALPC 
and Armed Violence Reduction – National SALW Commission 
DDR Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (of former combatants) DDR
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo  DRC
EUPOL European Union police mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo EUPOL 
DR Congo   DR Congo
EUSEC European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the  EUSEC 
DR Congo  Democratic Republic of the Congo  DR Congo
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo  FARDC
GRIP Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security  GRIP
IATG International Ammunition Technical Guidelines IATG
ISACS International Small Arms Control Standards ISACS
MAG Mines Advisory Group  MAG
MLC Movement for the liberation of the Congo  MLC
NAP National Action Plan on SALW control  NAP
PNC Congolese National Police  PNC
PSSM Physical security and stockpile management PSSM
RCD  Congolese Rally for Democracy  RCD
SADC Southern African Development Community SADC
SALW Small arms and light weapons SALW
SARCOM Sub-regional Arms Control Mechanism SARCOM
SOP Standard operating procedure SOP
SSR Security sector reform SSR
STAREC Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic  STAREC 
 of the Congo 
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UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service UNMAS
UN PoA  United Nations Programme of Action to Combat, Prevent and Eradicate the  UN PoA 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.
UNSAC  Standing Advisory Committee of the United Nations in Charge of  UNSAC 
Security Issues in Central Africa
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ABOUT THE PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS
BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion) 
is an independent, non-profit organization, based 
in Bonn, Germany. BICC’s objective is to conduct 
policy-driven research and provide technical advice 
on a number of topics, ranging from disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) to natural 
resource management and migration. BICC has a 
long history working in the field of SALW control, 
being involved in several international initiatives 
to curb the proliferation of illicit SALW. It aims to 
deliver research-informed policy advice to national 
governments and regional organizations in the 
field of arms control. In close cooperation with the 
German Federal Foreign Office, BICC has been spear-
heading basic arms control initiatives including 
marking, registration and stockpile security of arms 
and ammunition in eastern Africa and the Sahel. 
These activities take place under the framework of 
a sub-regional arms control initiative (SARCOM), 
which comprises six member countries and observer 
states and is currently based out of Khartoum, 
Sudan.
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) is a humanitarian 
non-governmental organization that works to save 
and improve lives by reducing the devastating 
effects armed violence and remnants of conflict have 
on communities around the world. MAG’s interna-
tional headquarters is based in Manchester, United 
Kingdom (UK) and is the support hub for MAG’s oper-
ations worldwide. MAG’s work in the DRC is amongst 
its most holistic and nationally empowering, 
employing humanitarian mine action and arms 
management and destruction initiatives to build 
national capacity and realize genuine resilience. 
MAG remains the only Mine Action operator author-
ized by the DRC’s Ministries of Interior and Defence 
to work on arms management and destruction.
The Groupe de recherche et d’information sur 
la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) is an independent, 
non-profit research institute based in Brussels, 
Belgium. GRIP has a track record of policy-driven 
research on arms transfers and on action to contain 
the uncontrolled spread of SALW. GRIP fieldwork and 
policy advice have focused on the governance and 
security situations in French-speaking countries on 
the African continent. GRIP currently participates 
in efforts coordinated by the UN Regional Centre 
for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and 
arrangements by the UN Trust Facility Supporting 
Cooperation in Arms Regulation (UNSCAR). 
The Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Armes 
Légères et de Petit Calibre et de Réduction de la 
Violence Armée (CNC-ALPC) is an inter-ministerial 
organization based in Kinshasa tasked with the 
coordination of all small arms and light weapons-re-
lated control activities in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. The CNC-ALPC has several field offices 
and served as the primary government counterpart 
for this evaluation providing access and liaising 
between the Congolese army, air force, naval forces 
and police forces. The main point of contact for the 
CNC-ALPC is Colonel Kasongo who serves as the 
FARDC liaison for CNC-ALPC and is the Head of 
Programming. The CNC-ALPC also deployed a four-
member delegation to assist with the study headed 
by Danilon Lifongo Bokila accompanied by Captain 
Budri Adobe Boise, Jacques Mulumba and Bijoux 
Mulumba.
SAFETY FIRST \ ACHARYA, GRUMEL & VRANCKX
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 2 \ 201684 \
bicc \
Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn 
Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH
Pfarrer-Byns-Straße 1, 53121 Bonn, Germany 
+49 (0)228 911 96-0, Fax -22, bicc@bicc.de 
www.bicc.de 
www.facebook.com/bicc.de 
Director for Research
Professor Dr. Conrad Schetter 
Director for Administration
Michael Dedek
AUTHORS
Nikhil Acharya is a BICC Technical Advisor on small arms  control and  
DDR based at the Sudan DDR Commission in Khartoum, Sudan (2012 to 2015)  
with field experience focused on the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Asia.  
He is currently advising the Regional Centre on Small Arms in Nairobi.
Olivier Grumel is a Technical Field Manager with expertise on  
explosive ordnance disposal and small arms control, currently based  
at MAG's Sahel field office in n'Djamena, Chad.
Dr An Vranckx is a Researcher at GRIP based in Brussels, Belgium,  
with ample field experience in Latin America and Africa.
COPYEDITOR
Heike Webb
SUPPORT
Lena Guesnet
DATE OF PUBLICATION
10 November 2016
PHOTOGRAPHS
Nikhil Acharya \ BICC
LAYOUT
kippconcept.gmbh, Bonn
CONCEPTION EDITORIAL DESIGN
Diesseits – Kommunikationsdesign, Düsseldorf
Member of
Johannes-Rau-
Forschungsgemeinschaft
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License;  
cf.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Supported by:


